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Introduction

RONALD

F. PHILLIPS, DEAN, PEPPERDINE SCHOOL OF LAW

Good morning. It's certainly a pleasure to welcome you to the
Odell McConnell Law Center, and to this symposium on current issues in securities regulation, sponsored by the Pepperdine Law
Review.
It is my assumption that you will find the program today both interesting and practical. Certainly the panelists are individuals who
should be well-prepared to give you useful insight into the areas to
which they have been assigned.
Because I think all of you who are present today are either lawyers
or future lawyers, I thought it would perhaps be appropriate to share
with you some news regarding the legal profession that would perhaps be of interest. I think it's not at all news to you that the legal
profession is under attack from many quarters, and I'd like to share
with you some frightening legislation that was shared with me by a
fellow law school dean, Michael Kelly from the University of Maryland, recently. This is entitled "An Act to Establish the Season and
Bag Limits on Attorneys." I'll share just a few of the key provisions.
Section 12A1. Any person with a valid Maine state hunting license may harvest attorneys for recreational, non-commercial purposes.
2. The taking of attorneys by traps or deadfalls is permitted. The use of currency as bait in prohibited.
3. Killing of attorneys with a vehicle is prohibited. If accidentally struck, remove dead attorney to roadside and proceed to nearest carwash.
4. It is unlawful to shout "whiplash," "ambulance" or "free scotch" for the
purpose of trapping attorneys.
5. Stuffed or mounted attorneys must have State Department of Health inspections for rabies and other disgusting diseases.
Section 12-B Bag Limits
The following bag limits are established:
a. Yellow-bellied sidewinder
2
b. Two-faced tortfeasor
1
c. Cutthroats
2
d. Backstabbing whiners
3
e. Silver-tongued drug defender
$500 bounty
f. Honest attorneys
extinct

We are engaged currently in trying to fight similar legislation
which is being :introduced in other states across the country.
1207

Let me mention just a little bit about Pepperdine University
School of Law to those of you who are not that familiar with us.
Pepperdine is a very young law school, less than twenty-five years
old, which is making excellent progress in any number of areas. Our
students come from all over the nation and from foreign countries,
and over the last dozen years, about half of our students have come
from states outside of California. Interest in our law school continues to grow; this most recent year, we received 3700 applications for
two hundred sixty places in the beginning class, so the competition is
quite keen.
Much more important, though, than the quantitative figures regarding our students, though, would be their quality and character.
It is in these areas that we are most grateful. Pepperdine students
and graduates tend to be people who approach their work very seriously, they tend to be people who treat other people with respect and
dignity, and who ultimately earn the confidence and trust of those
people who depend upon them.
We are particularly pleased that member of our 1990 graduating
class, Charles Eskridge, is currently clerking for U.S. Supreme Court
Justice Byron White; another of our alums, Randall Kehl, just completed a term as one of the twelve White House Fellows chosen nationally; and other alums are distinguishing themselves in various
ways.
The school attracts a great many high-visibility legal figures. Of
the current nine justices on the United States Supreme Court, six of
them have made recent visits to the law school, for a total of ten visits between them. Two of them have taught summer school for us
here, one serves on our Board of Visitors.
Within the last thirteen months, the nation's two respective Attorney Generals who have served during that period have both visited
the law school, as has the Solicitor General, the Supreme Court Chief
Justice of California, and the current Chief of Staff of the White
House. These are among many other distinguished visitors who regularly come to our school.
Our school has several distinctive characteristics, including the nation's oldest semester abroad program, which happens to be in
London; the fourth Institute for Dispute Resolution among American
law schools, and the first in the Southwest; a Distinguished Visiting
Professor program that brings to our school members of the judiciary
and other outstanding legal figures for teaching assignments; and a
focus for promoting an understanding of, and appreciation for, a high
level of professional responsibility and legal ethics. For a variety of
reasons, our school has much to offer.
Unfortunately, though, Pepperdine clearly is not the school for
1208

[Vol. 19: 1207, 1992]

Securities Symposium Transcript
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

everyone; it will be a very poor choice for those people who hate both
the mountains and the ocean, and are allergic to breathing fresh,
smog-free air.
Thank you very much for coming to be with us today. I trust that
your day will be both productive and enjoyable.

1209

PANEL ONE
PANELISTS:
MARC I. STEINBERG, RUPERT AND LILLIAN RADFORD PROFESSOR
OF LAW, SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY; OF COUNSEL, WINSTEAD, SECHREST & MINICK, DALLAS
GERALD BOLTZ, PARTNER, ROGERS & WELLS, LOS ANGELES
MARC I. STEINBERG

Thank you very much. I'm very pleased to be here. I wish to
thank the Law Review, Dean Phillips and Professor Kerr for sponsoring this program. My topic is an overview of securities law developments, and for those of you who want case citations, I will be
providing them.
This past year has seen many developments, and perhaps the case
that has generated the most publicity is the Supreme Court's decision
in Lampf, 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991), dealing with the statute of limitations for Section 10(b) actions. The Supreme Court adopted a uniform statute of limitations for Section 10(b), namely, one year after
discovery was made (or should have been made) of the facts constituting the violation, and in no event, more than three years after the
violation occurred. As significant, if not more so than the Court's
adoption of a uniform statute, was the Court's holding that Section
10(b) does not provide for equitable tolling. Therefore, the threeyear period is an outside limit.
Also, to the surprise of many, the Court retroactively applied the
principles of Lampf; however, that holding raised a great deal of controversy, and Congress passed legislation in late 1991 overturning the
retroactive application of Lampf. [See Section 27A of the Exchange

Act.]
There are a number of congressional proposals to modify Lamp'.
The Brian Bill in the Senate would basically impose a two-year/fiveyear statute, namely, two years after the plaintiff knew or should
have known of the facts constituting the violation and in no event
longer than five years; the Markey Bill in the House would impose a
three-year/five-year limitations period. However, both of these bills
have generated opposition, and many believe that if the Lampf decision is going to be overturned, there's going to have to be a quid pro
quo. Some individuals think, for example, that RICO's application to
securities fraud may be deleted as a quid pro quo. Alternatively, it
has been suggested that legislation be enacted narrowing the scope of
1211

discovery requests and permitting the imposition of costs against the
losing party in securities litigation. It remains to be seen what will
be the effect of these congressional proposals.
Nonetheless, I think one thing is for certain and that is an increasing number of securities plaintiffs are turning to state court. For example, Texas has a three-year/five-year statute, namely, three years
after discovery and in no event longer than five years. [Texas Securities Act Art. 581-33(H)]. My understanding is that California has a
one-year/four-year statute of limitations contained in Section 15506.
Moreover, it is unclear under some of the applicable blue sky statutes whether equitable tolling may be permitted. Of course, it is not
under Section 10(b), as decided by Lampf. In their treatise, Marsh
and Volk apparently take the position that equitable tolling may be
permitted under the California statute. [See Marsh & Volk, Practice
Under the California Securities Laws § 14.08[2][a], at 14-67 (1991)] It
seems as if the issue is open under California law; there are federal
court decisions, interpreting California law, that disagree on this issue. [Compare SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1308 (9th Cir.
1982), with Dahl v. Gardner, 583 F. Supp. 1262, 1266 (D. Utah 1984)
(interpreting California law)].
Also, I think we'll see state court actions coupled with 1933 Securities Act claims, due to the fact that claims can be brought under the
Securities Act of 1933 in state court without the right of removal [See
Section 22(a) of the 1933 Act]. For example, what I'm seeing in
Texas are state securities claims coupled with federal securities
claims under Section 12(2), plus of course your state common law
claims.
Now, with respect to Section 12(2), that is an area that has generated a great deal of litigation during the past few years. Section 12(2)
is the basic Securities Act of 1933 express remedy that goes to material misstatements or omissions contained in a prospectus or oral
communication. Generally, under that provision, if there is such a
material misstatement or omission, the purchaser may sue the seller,
with the seller having the defense of reasonable care. As you probably all know, in 1988, the Supreme Court decided the Pinter case
which defined the term "seller" under Section 12(1) [Pinter v. Dahl,
486 U.S. 622 (1988)]. Even though the Court's ruling was under Section 12(1), almost all courts have applied that definition to Section
12(2) actions as well, including the Ninth Circuit [Moore v. Kayport
Express, Inc., 885 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1989)]. The Supreme Court in
Pinter defined "seller" to include one who parts with title, an agent
for the vendor, and one who solicits the purchase with the motivation
to benefit him or herself or the securities owner. Several issues have
arisen in view of Pinter. One such issue is whether aiding and abet1212
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ting liability is appropriate under Section 12. Practically all courts after Pinter have said that it is not. Note, however, that controlling
person liability under Section 15 is implicated for a violation of Section 12.
A second issue is whether professionals acting solely in their professional capacity are sellers under Section 12. The Pinter language
basically sets forth that attorneys and accountants acting solely as
professionals Eire not Section 12 sellers. The lower courts have unanimously agreed. The Ninth Circuit case is Moore v. Kayport Express,
885 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1989). The concern here is that if the lawyer
takes on more of a promotional type-role, he or she may be called a
seller. For example, in a Second Circuit case, the attorney mailed the
private placement memorandum to prospective investors at the request of the promoter. The court said that this was not sufficient activity to constitute one a seller [Wilson v. Saintine Exploration &
Drilling Corp.:, 872 F.2d 1124 (2d Cir. 1989)]. Therefore, it seems as if
an attorney can engage in certain minimal efforts, although my advice would be for the attorney to perform solely within his or her
professional capacity.
Perhaps the key issue involving Section 12 is whether Section 12(2)
applies to secondary trading markets. It was assumed until fairly recently that oral communications that took place in the secondary
markets could trigger Section 12(2). However, in a number of decisions handed clown within the past few years, a number of courts, including the Third Circuit, have held that Section 12(2) is limited to
the initial offering context [Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc.,
925 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991)]. For example, one way in which Section
12(2) can be expansively utilized in the secondary trading markets is
when a broker makes a material misrepresentation with respect to
recommending a security that is traded in the public markets. Instead of the plaintiff relying solely on Section 10(b), having to show
reliance, causation, scienter and the like, the plaintiff also can invoke
Section 12(2) and recover without many of the burdens that Section
10(b) demands.
Professor Maynard over at Loyola has written a very good article
on this subject that was recently published in the William and Mary
Law Review [32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 847 (1991)]. Moreover, she is
scheduled to publish an updated article on this subject in the Summer 1992 Issue of The Securities Regulation Law Journal [20 Sec.
Reg. L.J. 152 (1992)].
Let me give you other examples where Section 12(2) can be used.
1213

Perhaps the provision is most frequently invoked in private offerings,
such as Reg. D deals. Also, although rarely used in this situation,
Section 12(2) may be employed in public offerings against a dealer.
As you know, a dealer, unlike an underwriter, is not subject to liability under Section 11. But a dealer normally is a seller, and would
come within Section 12(2)'s reach.
The Virginia Bankshares case [111 S. Ct. 2749 (1991)] decided last
Term in some ways seems to have broad application, and in fact in
some respects the decision does. In certain other ways, the decision
has what I foresee as relatively narrow application.
I will first turn to the decision's broad application. The Supreme
Court has made it clear by this decision that it does not favor implied
private rights of action. There were a series of cases in the late '70s
such as Touche Ross v. Redington [442 U.S. 560 (1979)] and Lewis v.
Transamerica[444 U.S. 11 (1979)] where the Court adopted a narrow
construction to implied rights. And then in the early '80s, with such
cases as Huddleston [459 U.S. 375 (1983)], for example, the Court
seemed to have adhered to a more flexible approach. In the Virginia
Bankshares case, the Court once again returned to a rather restrictive view, basically saying that if implied rights of action are to be
adopted, one must look at the congressional intent as embodied by
the particular statute's language and the pertinent legislative history.
Applying this standard, implied rights are likely to be recognized on
rare occasions.
Another key aspect of Virginia Bankshares goes to the "true purpose" cases. The true purpose cases not only arise in proxy litigation,
which this case involved, but also in your run-of-the-mill, Section
10(b) fraud litigation. These cases generally stand for the proposition
that the disclosure mandates focus on objective facts and not subjective revelation; that there is no requirement for management to disclose the transaction in pejorative terms. In Virginia Bankshares,
management opined concerning a squeeze-out merger that the price
offered to the minority shareholders was fair. What the Supreme
Court said was that this statement was actionable, if two things were
satisfied: First, that management believed that the price was not fair,
and second, that objectively the price was not fair. In other words, to
be actionable, the opinion or belief asserted by management must
misstate the fiduciary's actual belief or opinion, and secondly, must
be untruthful with respect to the subject matter addressed. Of
course, when disclosure documents are disseminated, there frequently is no requirement or need to have management give its opinion. But I might add that this decision will have application in going
private transactions under SEC rule 13e-3. This is because Schedule
13E-3 requires management to provide its opinion whether the price
1214
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offered is fair and the grounds for this opinion. When that happens,
of course, the rationale of Virginia Bankshares is going to apply.
Now I'm going to address what seems to be the narrow part of the
opinion. Although the majority in Virginia Bankshares had the
votes to carry the merger, they nonetheless solicited the shareholders. The plaintiffs argued that there was a material misstatement
and that the requisite causation was shown. The Supreme Court rejected that argument, reasoning that under the facts presented because the majority had sufficient votes, the proxy solicitation was not
an essential link in the consummation of the merger. The decision
can be read to mean that, whenever the majority has sufficient votes
to carry the merger, the minority cannot show causation even if
there is a material misstatement or omission. However, such a reading would be inappropriate, for the reason that the Court expressly
left open a key issue. The issue is whether adequate causation may
be shown if the majority's proxy solicitation induced the plaintiff minority shareholders to forego an otherwise available state remedy.
In Virginia Bankshares the plaintiffs did not have a right to appraisal under the language of the Virginia statute. That's very unusual in a squeeze-out merger. For example, in California, under the
Steinberg v. Amplica case [42 Cal. 3d 1198, 729 P.2d 683, 233 Cal.
Rptr. 249 (1986)], a shareholder in a squeeze-out has the right to appraisal. Therefore, the argument after Virginia Bankshares is that
the materially misleading proxy solicitation induced the minority
shareholder to forego his or her right to appraisal, which would have
been otherwise available. [But see Barth v. Nova Sensor, [1991-1992
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,494 (N.D. Cal. 1991).]
Also, the misleading proxy solicitation may have lulled the plaintiffs
into inaction, thereby bypassing an opportunity to enjoin the merger
in a state cout action [See Kidwell ex. rel. Penfold v. Meikle, 597
F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1979)]. In sum, by foregoing a state remedy that
was otherwise available, the materially misleading proxy solicitation
caused the shareholder loss.
I want to speak for a imoment on the Section 16 changes, and I'm
going to address only a couple of them [Securities Exchange Act Release No. 28869, [1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
84,709 (1991)]. As a former SEC enforcement attorney, I am bothered by some of these revisions. For example, the new rules with respect to derivative securities treat the acquisition of a derivative
security, rather than its exercise, as a purchase for Section 16 purposes. In other words, the purchase for Section 16 purposes occurs at
1215

the time of the purchase of the option, rather than at the time of the
option's exercise. Look at the following scenario where there is no
Section 16 liability: First, the insider purchases the derivative securities, such as stock options. The insider holds for six months, and
then buys the underlying securities by exercising the options. The
very next day, or in fact the very next moment, the insider thereupon sells the underlying securities. There has been opposition in
the Senate criticizing the SEC on this revision. The Commission's
rule change also goes against judicial authority on this subject. [See,
e.g., Colan v. Monumental Corp., 713 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1983)] It remains to be seen how the courts will react to this revision.
These Section 16 rule changes come at a time when the SEC has
declared war on insider trading. As we all know, proving insider
trading under the Chiarella [445 U.S. 222 (1980)] and Dirks [463 U.S.
646 (1983)] tests frequently is based upon circumstantial evidence and
can be very difficult for the Commission to prove at times, as shown
by the recent en banc Chestman decision by the Second Circuit. [947
F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc)] Section 16(b), however, is a rule of
strict liability and is not based upon circumstantial evidence.
Every single court decision that I am aware of has held that one
need be an officer or a director only at the time of either the
purchase or the sale to come within Section 16 [See, e.g., Adler v.
Klawans, 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959)]. What the SEC did with its recent rule amendments is simply change the law: That is, with certain
exceptions, before one becomes an officer or director of a publiclyheld company, one can engage in a purchase or sale. Then, if one
subsequently becomes an officer or director within six months and
engages in an offsetting transaction, such trading does not invoke
Section 16. Therefore, the SEC has changed the law. In so doing, it
has failed to provide sufficient justification.
For those of you who have a Section 16 practice, the Gollust case is
a very important decision [111 S.Ct. 2173 (1991)]. There, the Supreme
Court granted standing to a shareholder who instituted suit prior to
the merger of the issuer into the surviving corporation, concluding
that the shareholder can continue the action if he retains stock in the
surviving corporation. The decision seems to be broad - but it's not.
It's not for the reason that the Court stated that the plaintiff must be
a shareholder of the issuer at the time the suit was instituted. What
does that mean? For practical purposes, this means that if the shareholder institutes suit after the merger is effected, it may be that he
or she does not have standing to bring the Section 16(b) action. In
sum, it may be that although Gollust granted standing to the plaintiff, that in fact the ramifications of Gollust will be to narrow the
scope of plaintiff standing under Section 16.
1216
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I want to bring to your attention two cases, one of which Professor
Kerr will talk about in her discussion, out of the Ninth Circuit. One
is SEC v. Reynolds Enterprises [[1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 96,464 (9th Cir. 1991)], which defines the term security in an expansive way. She'll be talking about the "family resemblance" test as applied to that decision [See Reves v. Ernst & Young,
110 S. Ct. 945 (1990)]. I simply want to point out that the Ninth Circuit once again reaffirmed its adherence to vertical commonality as
being sufficient to satisfy the common enterprise requirement. And,
of course, all of you know that the Supreme Court has granted cert
in the Holmes case out of the Ninth Circuit. There, the Ninth Circuit
held that the Section 10(b) purchaser-seller requirement of Blue
Chip Stamps [421 U.S. 723 (1975)] does not apply to RICO actions [the
Supreme Court subsequently handed down its decision declining to
resolve this issue. 112 S. Ct. 1311 (1992)].
I wish to conclude by briefly addressing attorney liability. As we
are aware, attorneys are being sued for malpractice and securities
fraud to a much greater extent. In the opinion letter context, liability exposure is magnified. The Seventh Circuit's recent decision in
Ackerman v. Schwartz [[1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 96,460 (7th Cir. 1991)], from a court that narrowly construes
attorney liability, stands for this proposition. Moreover, many of
these actions are brought pursuant to state law, under the applicable
state securities statutes and for common-law malpractice. In several
states, including California, the attorney-client privity requirement
has been abandoned; under certain circumstances, third parties can
sue an attorney for malpractice [See Goodman v. Kennedy, 18 Cal. 3d
335, 556 P.2d 737, 134 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1976); M. Steinberg, Corporate
and Securities Malpractice (PLI 1992)]. And with that, I'll turn to
Gerry.

1217

GERALD E. BOLTZ
Mr. Boltz's Symposium comments are replaced here by his article, "The Impact of Recent Legislation on Federal Securities Law Enforcement"

In this article, I want to address some trends in the enforcement
program of the Securities and Exchange Commission resulting from
three pieces of federal legislation enacted during the last eight years.
It's well-known that the Commission has had one of the most effective enforcement programs of any federal agency. More recently, the
Commission has been successful in obtaining additional funds for enforcement purposes. The Commission's statutory tools prior to recent legislation were already quite awesome. These included the
power to bring injunctive actions with a wide variety of ancillary relief, including disgorgement, accountings, receiverships and other
specifically designed relief; administrative proceedings, including special proceedings such as 2(e) proceedings to bar or sanction professionals, stop-order proceedings on registration statements, 15(c)(4)
proceedings to correct filings; trading suspensions, foreign restrictive
lists; and last, but certainly not least, criminal reference. It was an
imposing array of weapons.
Several things have happened which resulted in Congress providing even greater weapons to the Commission. One was the proliferation of insider trading, which became a phenomenon of the '80s. In
the '70s, while I served the Commission in Los Angeles, insider trading cases were rare. But in the '80s, as the takeover phenomenon
caught fire, stock prices often jumped-ten, twelve points on takeover news. The advent of stock options also helped insider trading
become a very, very popular pastime.
Two pieces of federal legislation, the Insider Trading Sanctions Act
of 1984 (the "Sanctions Act") and the Insider Trading Securities
Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 (the "Enforcement Act"), were specifically directed at curbing these abuses. A third piece of legislation,
the Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act
of 1990 (the "Remedies Act") arose out of a growing perception that
the sanctions and enforcement remedies available to the Commission
were not flexible or not tough enough. While not specifically enacted
to address insider trading abuses, the Remedies Act clearly has also
provided the Commission with yet additional recourse in curbing this
abuse. Many laymen assume that the SEC previously had the power
to fine-but of course it did not. It could seek ancillary relief in injunctive actions, but in recent years the courts had shown a growing
reluctance to grant such relief. The cordial atmosphere that the
Commission enjoyed in the courts in the '50s and '60s, and perhaps
even into the '70s, changed dramatically as courts more frequently
questioned the Commission's claims. Further, defendants and their
1218
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counsel found that the collateral consequences of an injunction posed
great problems. As a result, more cases were contested. (Such collateral consequences can permanently prevent an enjoined person from
being associated with a broker/dealer, becoming a director of an investment company, and if entered against a lawyer or other professional, from practice before the Commission.) These concerns came
into focus with the publishing of the Treadway Report. This study,
headed by a former SEC commissioner, recommended that civil
money penalties be imposed by the Commission.
Let us examine further this legislation which has greatly impacted
the Commission's enforcement program. In the '80s, insider trading
was akin to drug abuse in that while the penalties increased, the
practice became more prevalent. The Commission made insider trading a priority in its enforcement program and sought help from the
Congress. The Sanctions Act of 1984 provided penalties that put
teeth in the Commission's program. Briefly, the Act for the first
time provided that in addition to disgorgement, the Commission was
entitled to seek civil penalties of three times the profits realized or
loss avoided in insider trading cases, which amounts were based upon
the difference between the transaction price and the price after dissemination of the information. (In practice, these cases have often
been settled with disgorgement and a one-time penalty or occasionally a two-times penalty.) As I read the Sanctions Act, it allows the
Commission to seek disgorgement of the profit in addition to the
three times penalty or a total of four times the profit realized or loss
avoided. The Commission has however not, to my knowledge, sought
that quantum of relief.
In Commission injunctive actions generally, there's no statute of
limitations; however, civil penalties under the '84 Act can be obtained
only for violations charged within five years of the transaction
involved.
In 1987, the Supreme Court decided the Tull case (Tull v. United
States, 481 U.S. 412), which held that, under the Clean Water Act, a
jury trial must be afforded a defendant where civil penalties are
sought to be imposed (although the court can determine the amount
of the penalty). Thus by analogy it appears that defendants against
whom civil penalties are sought under the '84 Sanctions Act are also
entitled to a jury trial.
Double jeopardy questions have also arisen as a result of the passage of the Sanctions Act, since criminal prosecutions involving both
incarceration and fines occurred in cases where the Commission
1219

sought civil money penalties. In the Halper case (U.S. v. Halper, 109
S. Ct. 1892), the Supreme Court examined that question. In Halper,
the criminal prosecution occurred first, and later the government
sought to impose a civil penalty. The court held that under such circumstances the action constituted double jeopardy. But it also seems
to be clear that the mere imposition of a civil fine or penalty does not
prevent a subsequent criminal prosecution because of double jeopardy protections.
In 1988, Congress enacted the Enforcement Act, which expanded
insider trading penalties to controlling persons and employers. For
the first time, it also gave the Commission the right to pay bounties
to informants, codified a private right of action for contemporaneous
traders, and required broker/dealers to establish "Chinese Wall" policies to prevent insider trading and to monitor compliance. This legislation brought most public companies (as well as many private
firms and companies) who had access to insider information to adopt
policies designed to prevent employee trading on inside information.
Today most law firms, accounting firms, and public companies have
such policies.
I believe the Remedies Act, in the long run, will have a much
greater impact upon securities law enforcement than the other two
pieces of legislation mentioned herein. Indeed, I think it ushers in a
new era of enforcement. While the "penny stock" provisions were
specially and narrowly designed to curb abuses in the penny stock
market, the remaining provisions of the legislation have broad applicability. The penny stock provisions regulated "blank check" offerings, and authorized the Commission to adopt fraud rules affecting
brokers and others offering and trading in penny stocks. The enactment of those provisions have immediately dealt a crippling blow to
abusers of the penny stock market.
The impact of the other provisions is only now beginning to be felt,
perhaps because most of the enforcement cases the Commission had
brought previously involved violations that occurred prior to October
15, 1990, the effective date of the Act. Today, the new Act is being
utilized by the Commission as it deals with more recent violations.
The features of the Remedies Act, in summary, include the right of
the Commission to seek in federal court civil money penalties and to
also seek such civil money penalties in administrative proceedings
against professionals in the securities industry (including broker/
dealers, investment advisors, and their associated persons) upon a
proper showing of a violation. In court, civil money penalties can be
sought against anyone for any federal securities law violation. The
Remedies Act, for the first time, gives the Commission the right to
issue administrative cease and desist orders and to apply to federal
1220
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district court for orders enforcing such cease and desist orders. The
Act appears to give the Commission the power, not only to issue
cease and desist orders, but also to specify steps which the respondent must take to comply with a cease and desist order. Such administrative proceedings can be brought not only against the primary
violators, but also against individuals who are deemed the "causes" of
such violations.
A controversial provision of the new Remedies Act gave the Commission the express right in federal court to seek an order barring
persons from acting as officers or directors of a public company.
There were some important changes from earlier versions of the legislation as proposed which initially gave the Commission rather than
the courts this power. Many argued that issues of who shall serve as
officers and directors of corporations are matters of state law or at
least matters which shareholders and not the Commission should determine. The revised provision, as enacted, gives this power to the
federal court only for scienter-based violations where the court finds
the officer or director is "substantially unfit" for the officer or director position.
The money penalties which can be imposed under the Remedies
Act in court and administrative proceedings generally fall into three
specific tiers, depending on the seriousness of the offense. In instances where the Commission seeks such penalties in federal court,
the court can go beyond those tier limits and impose a money penalty
equal to the defendant's gross illegal pecuniary gain. Otherwise,
fines within each tier are as follows: where there is no fraud, deliberate, or reckless conduct, the limit is $5,000 for individuals, and $50,000
for other entities. The second tier provides that if there is fraud, manipulation, or reckless conduct, the maximum fine is $50,000 for a
natural person, and $250,000 for other entities. The third tier is applicable where there is fraud with scienter plus a significant risk of
substantial loss to others. In such instance, the maximum fine is
$100,000 in the case of a natural person, and $500,000 for other
entities.
Assessment of money penalties in administrative proceedings requires a finding that such is in the "public interest." Certain factors
are to be considered in determining whether a case is appropriate for
such penalties, including: (1) whether or not there is deliberate fraud;
(2) the degree of harm to the public; (3) the degree of unjust enrichment to the respondents; (4) whether or not the respondent is a recidivist; (5) whether there have been past offenses of similar nature;
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(6) what is the deterrent value overall; (7) is the need to set an example and deter others from similar conduct; and (8) the ability of the
respondent to pay a penalty. Respondents in such proceedings have
the right to demonstrate that they do not have the financial ability to
pay a particular fine or penalty.
The Commission has the right in either court or administrative
proceedings to seek a cease and desist order, a disgorgement of illegal
profits and an accounting. With regard to persons and entities in the
securities industry, the Commission also has the right to issue temporary cease and desist orders, including ex-parte orders.
Some members of the defense bar anticipated that this legislation
would provide greater flexibility in fashioning settlements. The
Commission sought passage of the Act, in part, I believe, because it
thought that the legislation would deter recidivists and make the enforcement process more effective. In that regard, both the bar and
the Commission had a concern that the administrative proceeding
machinery which the Commission had used for many years was antiquated, slow, and the subject of a fair amount of criticism from the
bar. As a result, the Commission embarked on a study headed by
Commissioner Shapiro which recommended major revisions in the
rules for administrative proceedings in an effort to address those concerns. Due process concerns remain, however, as many feel that the
Commission's additional powers are so great that they give undue advantage to the agency. This perceived advantage, coupled with the
current Commission's aggressive bent in imposing sanctions, makes
settlement of enforcement proceedings quite difficult today. If this
situation continues, we may see more instances where Commission
enforcement cases are litigated. Notwithstanding the reforms of the
Shapiro Commission, Commission administrative proceedings continue to be criticized, in part because the Commission utilizes its own
"employed" judges. As a result, there remains, in some quarters, a
lack of confidence in the impartiality of such proceedings. The final
impact of the Remedies Act depends in large part on how this Act is
administered by the Commission in the days ahead. Based upon experience to date, however, the Remedies Act ushers in a new and
much tougher era in securities law enforcement.
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PANEL Two
PANELISTS:
HENRY LESSER, PARTNER, IRELL & MANELLA, LOS ANGELES
STEPHEN BAINBRIDGE, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
KENNETH LEHMAN,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,

HENRY LESSER

Good morning, everyone. We've decided to use the podium, a reflection on our stature maybe. First, Ken has asked me to say that he
will actually be speaking on nothing, because virtually everything he
might want to say about anything to do with proxy regulation is embargoed, except on the part of maybe Linda Quinn and her direct
deputy in D.C., who are the only people authorized to say anything
about the proposals that were issued for public comment last June,
and withdrawn. for reissuance last November, after the SEC was barraged by over six hundred letters. So Ken is really here in his individual capacity to talk, and I think this is preeminently suitable in an
academic institution and I am going to do some of it too, to talk about
more esoteric theoretical issues, and he has asked me to act as a
buffer between you and him on any kind of question that he might
not appropriately be able to answer, except by saying, by pleading the
Fifth or whatever.., so he is really here for the beach.
Steve is going to talk about an issue which I think is a subset of the
issues that I am going to try to outline here, which is of extreme importance. That is, the statutes that attempt to say or purport to say

the boards of directors owe fiduciary duties to people other than people who elect them. This panel could easily occupy the entire day;

actually we might, yet, except for Ken. In fact, last December in
New York City, the ABA had a two-day institute on this subject. It

is, in my judgment, the cutting edge corporate securities issue, or set
of issues, of the 1990s. It is a direct follow-on to the takeover wars of
the 1980s. At the ABA Institute, there were some people who believed, with maybe a degree of prescience, that executive compensation, which is part of what is subsumed under this topic, was going to

be the Willie Horton issue of the 1992 elections. I think there may be
some of overstatement in that but nevertheless, that issue has signifi-

cantly intruded into election-year politics as a result of President
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Bush's trip to Japan and the people he chose rightly or wrongly to
take them with him. You can't open a newspaper today, whether it's
a regular newspaper or Business Week, without seeing reference to
the issue of executive compensation, and the broader issues of corporate governance that stand behind that issue. There are bills in Congress dealing with corporate governance issues, and there are
probably more bills to come. So what is this issue, or set of issues,
that we are talking about here that we conveniently label corporate
governance? They deal with some pretty fundamental questions, like
who runs and who should run a corporation? Who votes for the people who run the corporation, and who should vote, and how should
they vote, and how should their votes be tabulated? To whom should
those people owe their duties, their residual, non-statutory duties, in
other words the duties that aren't legislated for by specific legislation
that deals with environmental liabilities to the public, plant closing
obligations to the employees; I am taking about the residual common
law/equitable duties. And, how should those people running these
corporations and owing these duties be paid, and should who determine that, and by the way, who should determine how they even get
nominated. These are pretty fundamental questions. Why have they
become so significant? How has this topic gotten to be so hot? Well,
I think there are at least three broad explanations for how this topic
has come to be the cutting edge issue of corporate and securities law
today.
First, we had the takeover boom of the 1980s. One of the by-products of that long, and by we MNA practitioners, fondly remembered,
era that we all hunger to see again... we want to resurrect our own
field of dreams and have all those cars piling down the highway with
clients, whether they are insider traders or not. A by-product of that
era was this seemingly endless line of cases with an infinitely variable set of fact patterns that was dealing with the question of to whom
do the directors owe their duties, and to what extent are the directors entitled to be proactive on behalf of the people to whom they
owe their duties, principally the shareholders in the context of those
cases, and in effect, interpose themselves between raiders and the
shareholders, and proactively take measures that would bar the
raider from proceeding with its bid. And in the course of those cases,
we really wrestled with some very fundamental issues, concerned
with the duty of loyalty, the duty of care and the business judgment
rule, and I know Steve's paper, and presumably his remarks, are going to talk about the potential application of some of those cases, particularly the Unocal case, in an analysis of state shareholder
constituency statutes.
I was saying to somebody at dinner last night as a person involved
in the Unocal/Mesa Petroleum war on behalf of Unocal, that at the
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time the Unocal decision of the Delaware Supreme Court came down
in 1985, for us who were involved in the matter it was a clear victory
inasmuch as the Delaware Supreme Court had vindicated the actions
of the Unocal Board in defending itself against Boone Pickens' takeover by making itself a so-called discriminatory self-tender, in which
everybody who was a shareholder of Unocal except Mr. Pickens and
his affiliates was entitled to tender their shares and Mr. Pickens and
his affiliates were not eligible to tender their shares. And we gave a
lot of thought before launching that tender offer as to whether or not
we might have significant federal court litigation from the SEC on
the basis of an implied obligation of non-discrimination in the federal
tender offer regulatory scheme. We were confident that any such litigation was not very likely to be successful, and that there was not
likely to be held to be an implied obligation of non-discrimination,
and we were right.
Judge Tashima in the federal district court, down the road in Los
Angeles, didn't really have much trouble coming to the conclusion
that there was no implied obligation of non-discrimination in the federal tender offer rules; there now is an express rule, 14(d)(10), and a
corresponding rule for self-tenders, promulgated directly as a result
of that ruling.
But we never really thought about the possibility of state court litigation under state corporate law doctrines, and I don't know if
there's anyone from Skadden here, but I gave them credit at dinner
last night for finding a fairly abstruse and ancient Delaware case as a
basis for litigating that issue in state court, and Vice Chancellor Caroline Berger was impressed by the theory to no end, and then finally
the Delaware Supreme Court said it was perfectly okay to discriminate against Boone Pickens-I mean that was basically the rationale
of the case. We won, but it turned out with the benefit of now seven
years of hindsight that that seminal case was really about narrowing
the scope of the board's ability to proactively interject itself into a
takeover bid by tightening up the burdens that were placed upon the
board of directors if it wished to invoke the business judgment rule,
and that case has spawned a vast progeny of case law. Now we don't
have hostile takeovers around anymore, for awhile, I hope-I mean I
hope it's only for awhile-but we nevertheless have that debate up
and running about directors' rights, directors' duties, the abilities of
shareholders to put a tight rein on directors. And yet at the same
time, we're in a recession, and we're in an environment in which
many people feel that inadequate corporate performance over maybe
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ten to twenty years is now reaping its sad return, especially relative
to performance of our international competitors in Europe and Asia,
particularly, of course, Germany and Japan. And so these issues that
were framed in the context of the "go-go" takeover boom days of the
'80s are now being refrained in terms of the "go-slow" days of the
1990s. But they are essentially the same issues.
And finally, of my three-and there could be and probably are
more but I've identified three-factors that are making this topic so
hot is the phenomenon of the institutionalization of the stock market. Perhaps this is the single most important factor of all. When
you get the papers that were written in connection with this program, you'll see that I cite some studies that have been done on this
topic, and the statistics are really quite staggering in terms of the
growth of the percentage of publicly traded securities of any one public issuer that are in the hands of the institutions. And it is clearly

now the case that a majority of the publicly traded stock of a majority of public companies is in the hands of institutions.
Now, what do I mean by institutions? They don't constitute some
monolithic block. In that group you have short-term holders and
long-term holders, you have public pension funds and private pension
funds who have very different characteristics; you have insurance
companies, you have brokers, you have arbitrageurs; it's an array of
professional shareholders, and they don't all have the same goals and
they don't all act in concert, and if they did act in concert there
would be very significant violations of SEC regulations about failing
to file 13D's for five-percent-or-greater groups of shareholders, and
no one of these institutions typically holds more than about one or
two percent of a company's stock. But nevertheless, in the aggregate
what you have is a situation in which professional investors, with all
of the tools available to them, the computerized tools, the tools of a
staff of MBAs, the tools of much greater access to senior management of public companies, by working the network, are in control of
most public companies. So the Mom-and-Pop perspective of who is
the typical shareholder and what is the relationship between that
typical shareholder and the company's management has dramatically
changed.
Now I would suggest to you.., and now I'm moving from the practical side to the theoretical side because we are under the umbrella of
an academic institution and can do a little bit of theoretical speculation... I would suggest to you, and this is the central thesis of my
paper, that it is time for us at least to seriously question in light of
what I have talked about whether or not the basic paradigm of corporate law is adequate to deal with the kinds of issues that we are wrestling with. By the phrase "the basic paradigm of corporate law" I
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mean the following: very simplistically put, going back to Corporations 101: the shareholders elect the directors; the directors have
oversight and stewardship over the affairs of the corporation; the directors have a significant amount of delegated authority, because the
shareholders aren't in a position to familiarize themselves with the
all data that is relevant to decision making with respect to the affairs
of a corporation; the shareholders' remedy lies in the ballot box, at
least once every year, or if the company has a staggered board in effect over the course of a three-period when the totality of the board
of directors have come up for election. Recalls are possible, but typically very hard because the corporation is permitted, and most have,
to institute into its charter and by-laws procedures which make what
I am calling recalls but of course in the corporate law context
aren't-I'm trying to draw a very crude analogy to the political process. They're possible but they're very hard. The directors owe their
duties exclusively to the shareholders, except that they may take into
account non-shareholder interests and here I'm not talking about
statutes, I'm talking about the basic paradigm as reflected in our case
law, in our common law/equity thinking. They may take into account the non-shareholder constituencies to the extent that there is
an articulable, rational relationship between the shareholders' interests and the interests of those other constituencies. So, for example,
they may give money away to charity to the extent that they make a
rational determination that this enhances the corporation's profile as
a good corporate citizen and redounds to the benefit of the corporation and therefore ultimately to the shareholders' pocket book. Similarly, they may take into account the interests of the employees,
because to the extent that the corporation isn't a kinder and gentler
employer, it may lose its lifeblood and that will redound to the detriment of the corporation and its shareholders. But essentially the
twin duties of care and loyalty are owed exclusively to the shareholders. That's the fundamental paradigm.
Now, you begin to ask yourself, 'Well, how does that paradigm
work in the 1990s in terms of the stock market?' Is it enough to say
that the shareholders are all one group, and the board of directors
owes its duties exclusively to that group, or do we need to consider
the possibility that maybe there are different groups of shareholders
with different interests and maybe just conceivably they need different representation which our system is not designed to create, different kinds of directors elected by different groups of people, and with
different levels of role. Take the part of the paradigm that deals
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with the activist powers of a board of directors. One of the things the
Unocal case did hold that was not limiting was that it reaffirmed the
proposition that the directors have an activist role to play in the corporate governance structure, and specifically in the context in that
case of a takeover defense, but the language is broader; that our
model, unlike models in other countries like the UK for example,
does not expect the directors to stand pat, announce their views and
let the shareholders decide. We have a quite expansive view of what
directors can do, and if you take the typical corporation statute, the
kinds of transactions which are subject to a shareholder vote are
fairly limited.
Look, for example, at one of the most important cases in that progeny of Unocal that I referred to earlier, the Time-Warner case. In
the Time-Warner case, Time's board of directors was held entitled to
restructure a merger with Warner into a tender offer for Warner in
combating a hostile tender offer that Paramount made for Time after
the Time-Warner merger agreement was announced. The TimeWarner merger would have required shareholder approval. An acquisition by Time of Warner through a tender offer in which the
Warner shareholders would tender their shares to Time, did not require the approval of Time's shareholders. And part of the rationale
of the case in the Delaware Supreme Court--and it's a complicated
opinion and seemingly no two lawyers can agree on what it actually
holds--but part of the rationale of the case was that buying Warner
was an exercise by Time's board of the conventional power of a board
of directors to buy businesses without having to get a shareholders
vote, and to deploy corporate funds to do so even if it meant going
out and borrowing 15 or 20 billion dollars to do so.
Now, time is short, we have to move on and as I said we could easily occupy an entire day talking about these issues. I hope that the
paper that I have written on the subject when you get it will kind of
elaborate on these issues that I'm raising, but essentially what I'm
here to say here today is that lying behind the SEC's initiatives on
expanding the access of shareholders to proxy process, lying behind
the bills in Congress that deal with caps on executive pay and a
greater role for shareholders in executive pay, lying behind essentially all this tinkering, it seems to me are some very significant questions which we lawyers, from the academic sector, from the in-house
sector, from the outhouse sector, are all uniquely qualified to deal
with and we have a special responsibility to deal with them. And this
is what I want to leave you with. And I was very impressed when
Bayliss Manning, who is a doyen of the corporate and securities bar,
and who's written extensively on this subject, made this point at the
ABA program in New York in December. He made the point that it
was our predecessors, one hundred and fifty, two hundred years ago,
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lawyers working with their clients, who created a vehicle called the
corporation, or the joint stock company, or the limited liability joint
stock company-whatever you want to call it-a vehicle built out of
bits and pieces of all sorts of other theories, such as trusts and church
charities and the like, that was adequate, more than adequate, to deal
with the capital-raising and the capital-deployment needs both of the
industrial revolution in the United Kingdom and the burgeoning independent United States. We've essentially lived with that paradigm
for a hundred fifty, two hundred years.
It is time for us to consider how adequate that paradigm really is,
and stop trying to fit square pegs into round holes and stretch concepts to or beyond their breaking point by engrafting in my view
things that just don't work, like non-shareholder constituencies statutes and the like, or slipping in a piece of legislation that deals with
executive compensation. It is time to step behind that, and we should
be doing that. We should be doing what our forebears did. And if we
don't, I would suggest to you that what we are going to end up with
will be an absolutely horrendous, unworkable system, which is going
to be a typical product of the political process, which is going to be a
mess, which isn't going to work well, and which is ultimately not going to serve the needs of the business community or of the people
who invest in corporations, or of the employees that work there. So
with that exhortation for us to all sort of think about these issues
and hopefully the academic institutions, including this great law
school, can take a lead in visiting how these issues should be handled,
I'm going to turn it over to Steve.
STEPHEN BAINBRIDGE

Thank you. Non-shareholder constituency statutes are a species of
state corporate law. Why, you might reasonably ask, am I speaking
about state corporate law at a securities regulation symposium?
Largely because acquisition work arguably has been for many years
the most important component of securities practice and, despite the
recent slowdown, it seems unlikely that takeovers, even hostile takeovers, are going to become extinct. There's too much money to be
made and too many of us that want to make it. In today's legal environment, however, the success or failure of a takeover bid is more
often determined by state corporate law, particularly state takeover
laws, than it is by federal securities law. Accordingly, I want to direct our attention this morning for a few moments at what may be
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the single most important category of state takeover laws: the nonshareholder constituency statutes.
These statutes come in various forms; some have more bells and
whistles than others, but when you strip them down to their common
component, they all share a single feature: they permit boards of directors, when making corporate decisions, to consider the effects of
the decision on various non-shareholder constituencies. These socalled stakeholders typically include employees, customers, creditors,
suppliers, and the like.
As Henry suggested, non-shareholder constituency statutes have
profound implications for corporate governance, the structure of corporate law, and the societal role of corporate takeovers. As such,
whether the statutes represent sound social policy is a critical question, but you will be relieved to know that it's not the one I'm going
to talk about today. As the academic on the panel, I thought it would
be appropriate for me to talk about some very practical. issues.
These statutes are now on the books in over half the states.
Twenty-eight to be precise, the last time I counted, but that was a
couple months ago and there may have been some more since then.
In any case, none of these statutes is likely to be repealed any time
soon. Unfortunately, the statutes raise almost as many questions as
they answer. We rather urgently need an interpretation of the statutes that resolves some of these issues.
While my article in the symposium issue will describe the statutes'
implications for a variety of corporate transactions, my remarks today will focus on their role in hostile takeovers because it's here that
they present the most interesting and challenging questions. Consider then the following scenario, one we all came to know and love
in the '80s, but have not seen in a while: Bidder Co. makes an unsolicited tender offer for Target Co. at a substantial premium over market. Bidder's state and federal disclosure documents indicate that the
bid will be highly leveraged. Bidder also intends to close two of Target's U.S. plants and open new plants abroad. Target's board of directors rejects the bid, arguing that the detrimental impact on the
Target's employees and creditors will outweigh whatever gains the
shareholders are going to reap. The board puts teeth into their decision by adopting a poison pill and the usual other defenses.
The board's decision is problematic at best under Delaware law.
Delaware expressly forbids management from protecting stakeholders at the shareholders' expense. Rather, anything the directors do
to make stakeholders better off also must shareholders better off.
The non-shareholder constituency statutes clearly reject that approach. Let me suggest that there are two plausible extreme interpretations of the statute. One is that they permit directors to
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disregard shareholder interests entirely. This seems an unlikely interpretation. For one thing, it's contrary to the statutory language.
In many states, the statutes expressly require the board to consider
shareholder interests. In many other states, the statute at least implicitly requires the board to consider shareholder interests. Moreover, an interpretation that permits the board to totally disregard
shareholder interests would be contrary to some of the received
norms of corporate law that Henry talked about. In particular, the
basic goals of management accountability and shareholder wealth
maximization would be called into question. It's unlikely that the
legislatures would have rejected-notice I use the word rejectedthese basic norms--assuming they knew what they were doing,
which at least in Illinois is an assumption that one makes at one's
own risk-without doing so more explicitly.
At the other extreme is an interpretation under which these statutes merely codify the existing common law rules, by which most
people mean the existing Delaware rules. This interpretation also
seems unlikely. Why would twenty-eight legislatures have bothered
to adopt these statutes if they did nothing? Moreover, consider the
context in which these statutes were adopted. While most apply to
all corporate decisions, they were all adopted in the context of an
ongoing takeover fight. Clearly, they were intended to make takeovers harder. Well, how do we do that? By modifying the shareholder wealth maximization norm just enough to permit directors to
make trade-offs between shareholder and stakeholder interests.
Indeed, this trade-off interpretation is effectively mandated by the
statutory language: the right to consider non-shareholder interests is
of little utility if you can't act to protect them. In other words, what
the statutes do is to permit the board to say, "We're going to take a
reduction in shareholder welfare because that will permit us to capture greater gains for stakeholders."
Having said that, most of the statutes simply do not address the
critical question of how courts should review a board of director decision that is supposedly premised on a concern for non-shareholder
constituents. This omission is especially troubling given the nature of
the transaction in question. In my scenario, Target's board of directors may have been legitimately concerned for their workers and employees. But they may also have been worried about their own
positions. The conflict of interest faced by Target's board of directors
in this situation is too well-established, and too well-documented, to
need elaboration here. Suffice it to say that there's good reason to be
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suspicious when management claims to be acting in the best interests
of either the shareholders or the stakeholders.
My point is not that Target directors have no role to play in corporate takeovers or that Target directors should ignore stakeholder interests. Whatever the theoretical merits of such an approach, the
non-shareholder constituency statutes plainly do not allow it. At the
same time, however, everything we know about the legislative history of the statutes suggests that the drafters--and by drafters I
mean the legislators who adopted the legislation, not the corporate
lawyers who wrote it--did not intend to provide a cloak behind
which selfish director behavior can escape scrutiny. We see this, for
example, in the legislative history of the Pennsylvania statute, where
the question was explicitly asked, "Won't this let directors protect
themselves?" and the answer by bill's sponsor was no. So if we take
the legislators at their word, courts need to come up with an interpretation that permits us to distinguish legitimate concern for stakeholders-what the statute allows-from false concern motivated by
self-interest-which the statute does not, or at least should not,
allow.
Happily, such a mechanism is close at hand; namely, a modified
version of the Unocal rule to which Henry referred earlier. Recall
that in Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum the Delaware Supreme Court
adopted a two-pronged standard for reviewing takeover defenses.
First, the board must show that they had reasonable grounds for believing that there was a threat to the corporation or its shareholders.
Secondly, the directors must show that the defense they adopted was
reasonable in relationship to that threat. Only if they satisfy both
prongs of the test do they get the protections of the business judgment rule.
I propose that courts modify the Unocal standard for use as a
mechanism to review director action under a non-shareholder constituency statute. Under the first prong, the directors must show
that they reasonably believed the bid poses a threat to non-shareholder interests. Obviously that task should not prove too difficult.
In the scenario I painted earlier, for example, they can point to plant
closings, with resulting layoffs, and the highly leveraged nature of
the bid, with in all likelihood subsequent downgrading of the firm's
pre-existing debt.
The second prong is a requirement of proportionality between the
threat the board identifies and the board's response. Specifically, the
board must show that the defense is reasonable in relationship to the
threat to non-shareholder constituencies. This prong is the critical
one if we are going to control management behavior. Absent an effective proportionality standard, any threat to non-shareholder inter1232
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ests, no matter how mild or how insignificant, would permit bid
preclusive defenses.
Under this approach, management does not have unbridled discretion to disregard shareholder interests in the face of a threat to nonshareholder interests. Rather, in making the trade-offs the statute
permits, the board must minimize the impact of their decision on the
shareholders. In other words, their decision must impose no greater
burden on the shareholders than is necessary to protect the nonshareholder constituencies. If the court finds that less restrictive
measures would have adequately protected the non-shareholder interests at stake, the defense should be invalidated.
Some will object, I suspect, that courts rarely engage in this sort of
substantive review of board decisions. And that's true, but so what?
Judges are not doctors, but they review medical decisions every day.
Judges are not engineers, but that certainly doesn't preclude design
defect litigation. The traditional justification of the business judgment rule, that judges are not business experts, thus simply makes
no sense. There are good and sufficient prudential reasons, I believe,
for the business judgment rule, but not all board decisions should be
exempt from review. In cases like this one, where the conflict of interest is so pronounced, strict judicial scrutiny of the board's conduct
seems perfectly appropriate, as demonstrated by cases like Unocal
and Revlon.
In any case, judicial review under my proposal can focus mainly on
questions of process, which are well within the courts' traditional
competence. In conducting proportionality review, then, a court
should closely scrutinize management's arguments. For example,
when did the board know about the threat? When did they consider
the threat? Was it at the time they decided to resist the bid, or is the
threat really an ex post facto justification for their decision? The
court also should consider the history of the firm's treatment of its
non-shareholder constituencies. A long history of concern for stakeholders lowers the likelihood that the board is now cobbling together
an argument out of whole cloth.
An effective proportionality standard will not only help detect and
punish management misconduct, but should also give management
incentives not to cheat in the first place. Dishonest management, if
they have to meet this proportionality standard, will find it difficult
to construct a plausible story of non-shareholder injury. It will be
difficult for dishonest management to find experts who can credibly
support their story. Indeed, stakeholders themselves may decline to
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support a dishonest management story. Independent directors may
be unwilling to risk the reputational injury and litigation that would
result from supporting a false story. And, finally, of course, the hostile bidder will be seeking to rebut management's story and perhaps
seeking to recruit stakeholder support.
In conclusion, the test I've proposed will deter management misconduct, but more important, will give management incentives to determine whether or not stakeholder and shareholder interests in fact
diverge. The model I've set forth today thus gives directors incentives to act in precisely the manner that the statute's drafters claimed
to envision: as leaders of the corporate community, balancing the interests of all of their constituencies. Thank you.
HENRY LESSER

Thank you very much, Steve. Before I ask Ken to make his "nonremarks," let me just say that one of the states that does not have a
non-shareholder constituency statute is the great state of California.
We almost had one three or four years ago, SB 503, which would
have said, in typical California broad-brush style, something broader
than any statute I think Steve has reviewed, that the directors may
consider and act in the public interest in any decision that they make.
The state bar corporations committee would have written an incredibly effective letter authored by I wonder whom but the letter was so
effective that without ever having to be written, the bill was abandoned. That's not to say that we might not have one in the future,
and so you should keep a watch for what goes on in Sacramento
these days.
KENNETH LEHMAN

Against the backdrop of Henry's grand new corporate order, I'm
here to discuss some tinkering. At the outset, I'd like to emphasize
that I am here as an independent commentator; the views I express
are my own and not necessarily those of the Commission. I do not
represent the Commission, and as a matter of policy, the SEC disclaims responsibility for the private statements of any of its employees. I should also point out that I haven't been involved in the
Commission's rule-making proceedings in the area of proxy rule
revision.
I'm going to be looking at federal securityholder communication
rules, as affected by the recent tremendous increase in institution, including pension fund, ownership of publicly traded equities. I will
sprint through the current rules in a few minutes and then try to distinguish two basic types of securityholders: average securityholders,
and control securityholders and management. Then I'll try to fold in
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the new pension fund shareholders that we're seeing a lot more of
these days. Finally, I will propose a few revisions in this area.
The first question that comes up in this area, from a practical
standpoint, is when does the solicitation occur? For example, when
shareholders communicate, at what point do their communications
change from a mere discussion of the performance of their securities'
corporate boards to solicitation of support for proposed changes in
the corporate board? In this context, I will discuss the tension that
arises in terms of advocacy or preliminary testing the water types of
communications. The seminal case in the area is SEC v. Okin, a 1943
case which considered communications that were part of a continuous plan that was to end in a solicitation and which prepared the way
for its success. The importance of Okin is that it held that a solicitation occurs very much earlier than most people had thought; in fact it
occurs in the early policy-formulation stages.
Jumping from 1943 to the present, the recent cases in this area
have been particularly unhelpful. Some cases say that a solicitation
occurs where there are attempts to influence shareholder opinion.
The Commission's rules, on the other hand, are very arbitrary and
technical, but at least they're usually very clear.
First of all, there are two safe harbors in the case of a solicitation.
Solicitations of fewer than ten shareholders don't need to comply
with the Commission's solicitation rules, and second, there is an exemption for the furnishing of proxy voting advice by a financial advisor to persons with whom the advisor has a prior business
relationship.
If there is a solicitation, then two primary rules kick in. The first
one is what I will refer to as the contemporaneous requirement,
which requires that, with two exceptions, a solicitor provide information specified in Schedule 14(a) to those to whom he solicits, and that
he file this information a few days before he uses it. The two exceptions are for "stop, look and listen" material, in the case of election
contests, and second for preemptive solicitations by an opposing party
in non-election situations. These communications alert securityholders that a solicitation is imminent and tell them of matters
that are to be addressed.
The information that must ultimately be provided I'll refer to as
Schedule 14 information. The amount of information required by
Schedule 14A depends on the scope of the matters for which securityholders' proxies are being solicited. Schedule 14A requires general
information about the date, time and place of the meeting, revocabil1235

ity of the proxy, dissenters' rights of appraisal, and identification of
the person making the solicitation and his interest in the transaction
concerning which he is soliciting. In the case of mergers, consolidations, and acquisitions and similar transaction, Schedule 14A will require historic and pro forma financial information.
So, to step back and look at the practical consequence of the rules
we've just talked about: when more than eleven shareholders begin
talking among themselves, their communications are likely to be
deemed solicitations quite early in the dialogue. At that point shareholders must break off all communication unless they gather Schedule 14A information, prefile it with the Commission (as we'll discuss)
and present it to the ten other shareholders who are engaged in the
discussions.1
The second requirement that kicks in upon a solicitation is the
prefiling requirement; the initial solicitation generally needs to be accompanied by Schedule 14A information that was prefiled. Schedule
14A information usually must be filed with the Commission ten days
before it is given to securityholders in the initial solicitation. The
"stop, look and listen" material that I referred to earlier has to be
prefiled five days; additional material has to be filed for two days
before it's used; and speeches, press releases and scripts must be
mailed to the Commission on the day on which they are used.
The exception in this area is for "plain vanilla" proxy statements.
Plain vanilla proxy statements are basically proxy statements that
don't cover much more than the company's slate of directors that will
be voted on at the annual meeting, as well as shareholder proposals
required to be in the proxy statement under 14(a)(8). Interestingly,
management is able to use the plain vanilla exception even if it lobbies against the shareholders' proposal.
Now I am going to try to distinguish two types of shareholders that
are affected by these rules. In the early 1900s, Berle and Means suggested that in the modern corporation, as voting power becomes dispersed, control is consolidated in the hands of management. After a
while, management alone controls the corporation. On the other
hand, many corporations have not evolved into the Berle and Means
model of the modern corporation, and in these corporations large
shareholders continue to exert influence over the corporation.
Under both of these models, small shareholders are disenfranchised
in favor of either large shareholders or management.
The manner in which small shareholders can benefit from owning
securities is through marginal increases in the value of their shares.
Small shareholders generally will be unable to communicate to bring
1. In this context, the Commission's "group" rules may be even more oppressive
than the solicitation rules.
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about this effect because the costs of communicating will bring about
only a small increase for them since they own a small number of
shares. For this reason, small securityholders generally will not communicate. On the other hand, large shareholders, including management, are able to engage in activities that benefit them more than
just by the marginal increase in the value of the shares. For example, control shareholders can engage in roll-ups, merger transactions,
self-dealing transactions, green mail and that sort of thing. These activities will frequently harm individual shareholders.
Under this model, control shareholders and management have a
great deal to gain by communicating. Average shareholders, however, have an interest in restrictive securityholder communication
rules; they are not going to communicate themselves, and so they
want the rules to be restrictive so that large shareholders who do
communicate will be limited in their ability to engage in control activities or otherwise act in a manner that harms the individual
shareholders.
Along with the two basic types of shareholders I've identified,
we've recently seen a third: pension funds. Commentators estimate
that up to thirty percent of all public equity is held by pension funds.
Pension funds have the resources of control shareholders, and are
likely to engage in shareholder activism. But unlike control shareholders, this activism will frequently benefit average shareholders.
Pension funds are not able to engage in control transactions because
of general trust restrictions, state fiduciary laws, and the portfolio
theory. Rather, like average shareholders, they benefit from marginal increases in the value of the securities that they hold. Their communications and activism will have a goal of increasing the value of
each individual share; and to the extent that this goal is realized, average shareholders benefit.
One of the primary types of communications that pension funds
will make and that is likely to benefit average shareholders is the
preliminary testing the waters that I talked about earlier. These preliminary conversations will probe to determine mutual interests. As
I discussed, in a lot of cases average shareholders and pension funds
will have common interests. Further, the polled parties will often
have suggestions that may be incorporated into the ultimate solicitation by the person who is conducting the preliminary communications. Moreover, those who are going to engage in control activities
frequently will not use this type of preliminary conversation; it's
pointless to poll other shareholders to get their view on a control
1237

transaction that will only benefit the polling party. Of course, there
are control blocks of shareholders, but typically these are going to be
smaller than eleven, and they already have the benefit of the ten-person exemption from the communication rules.
In my view, the courts and the Commission should foster these
preliminary communications and still protect average shareholders.
They can do this by focusing on the individual who was solicited
rather than the individual who solicits, or even the content of the
communication; after all, the primary purpose of the communication
rules is to protect the individual who was solicited. I join others in
proposing that the Commission exempt solicitations of only sophisticated investors. If they're sophisticated, they probably 'already have
the Schedule 14A information; if they don't have it, they will require
it before they will execute a proxy. Second, the Commission should
expand the ten-person safe harbor to fifty shareholders; this would
encourage preliminary testing the waters among persons who have
the same sort of interest in increasing the marginal value of shares.
Third, the Commission should revisit the contemporaneous requirement in the context of preliminary communications, or in this
case, communications that occur prior to thirty days before the shareholders' meeting or the final date for the receipt of consents. These
rules should be relaxed for three reasons. First, as commentators
point out, requiring Schedule 14A information so early in the course
of what eventually may turn out to be a solicitation requires great expense very early on, and discourages preliminary discussions among
shareholders who have a common interest in increasing corporate
performance. Second, it ignores the reality that opposing parties are
likely to point out inconsistencies; although opposing parties won't
have the Schedule 14A information against which to compare the solicitation as it occurs, they will probably eventually get it. Under the
rules that I'm proposing, they'll eventually be able to compare inconsistencies and point them out in solicitations in opposition. Finally,
when combined with the preclearance requirement, the contemporaneous requirement prevents timely solicitations in opposition. For
example, management generally under state law must mail their
proxy statements only ten or twenty days before the meeting to
which it relates. If management prefiles their materials in non-public form, anyone opposing the solicitation has a very short time in
which to formulate their own opinions, prepare a proxy statement
that complies with Schedule 14A, file the proxy statement and wait
up to ten days before soliciting in support of their own proposal. My
proposal would be to free communications from having to be accompanied by Schedule 14A information. If the communicator wants to
give the proxy card, however, he could do so only if it is accompanied
1238
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by Schedule 14A information.2 If he wants to communicate within
the thirty days, he would also have to provide Schedule 14A
information.
The final proposal that I would put forth today is in preclearance
area. As we talked about, generally proxy materials need to be filed
ten, five, or two days before they're used. We talked about the delay
in the case of management's filing and then going out with the material a very short period of time before the annual meeting. Also, a
number of commentators argue that the preclearance requirement is
a violation of the First Amendment, because it's a more extensive restriction than necessary. And finally, the preclearance requirement
results in a number of inequities, particularly where management is
able to mail their plain vanilla without prefiling, even if dissidents
have said or indicated that they intend to run their own slate. If
management does not refer to that slate, they are able to mail their
own materials without prefiling, whereas the dissidents must prefile
their 14A information and wait ten days. And finally, in the plain vanilla proxy statement, management is also able to comment on shareholders 14(a)(8) proposals that are included in the plain vanilla
materials, and shareholders who would like to solicit in support of
that shareholder proposal have to prefile, so it is kind of an inequity
in that situation.
To address these problems with preclearance, I would propose that
only the 14A information be precleared, and that in the case of management, the prefiing be for ten days but the material would be public upon filing. This would give dissidents a number of days to look
at the material before finally filing their own pieces. Dissidents
would only be under an obligation to prefile for five days, which
would give dissidents and management the opportunity to mail on
the same day.
The Commission's proxy rules are basically fair and evenhanded.
But the presence of pension funds that will police the markets for
the benefit of the average shareholders makes some of the restrictions obsolete. Hopefully, the Commission's recent activity in this
area will result in some loosening of these rules, to the benefit of average shareholders.
HENRY LESSER
Thank you very much, Ken. Before we take just a couple of ques2. The Commission's proposed rules have a similar requirement.
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. we are running late, but this is hopefully an interesting
. let me just make a couple of observations about what Ken

said in supplementing them.
First, his proposal would focus on the nature of the recipient of the
solicitation; the Commission's June 1991 proposal would focus on the
nature of the soliciting party, and would have adopted, and I think
will be re-proposed to adopt, some concept whereby disinterested
persons as solicitors would be exempt. Disinterested persons would
be defined to mean people who are not management and do not have
certain enumerated financial interests in the solicitation. So, Ken as
an individual would focus on the opposite end of the spectrum, so to
speak, from what the Commission would. By the way, in an hour
now you've heard Steve make a concrete proposal for how non-shareholder constituency statutes should be interpreted, Ken make some
very interesting individual proposals about the proxy rules, and me
suggesting we tear up the corporate laws and start all over again, so
don't say you didn't get some unusual and possible even heretical
thoughts here. The other thing I wanted to mention that I know,
from speaking to Ken ahead of time, he was a little leery about getting into in his non-individual capacity, was--and you really should
focus on this-that at a press conference (not this past Thursday, but
the Thursday before, the week before last), Chairman Breeden unveiled his eagerly awaited Commission initiatives in the area specifically of executive compensation that I alluded to earlier, and there
are three parts to it and they're extremely important, so I just want
to very briefly mention them to you and alert them to you. There's
not written texts yet available.
First, it is going to be a lot easier for shareholders, under the Rule
14(a)(8) guidelines that Ken referred to, to be allowed to get into
management's proxy materials proposals that deal with executive
compensation review by shareholders, so long as those proposals are
put forward by a shareholder who is otherwise eligible for a 14(a)(8)
proposal, which is basically dependent upon how much shares you
own, how long you've owned them, and the size of the proposal, the
number of words in the proposal. It'll be easier to do that provided
the proposal is precatory in nature, i.e., is advisory and not binding
on the Board. This reverses an extremely longstanding position of
the staff that proposals relating to executive compensation are within
the "ordinary business of the corporation" exception of Rule 14(a)(8),
(c)(7). That position has been taken in letters that have been mailed
out to ten public companies that had received such proposals and had
sought to get the SEC's permission to omit them for the 1992 proxy
season. Those letters reversed that position, those companies are
now stuck, they can't omit them, and this will probably open the
floodgates.
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Secondly, the commission, when it comes back out with its new, revised proxy reform proposals, is going to include a fairly controversial idea for a table that values non-cash compensation, under a
formula yet to be unveiled, and to include a chart that compares corporate performance over a three-year period to chief executive pay
over the same three-year period, on what some would say is a simplistic notion, but I don't want to be editorializing here-some would
say that you can draw meaningful inferences from that kind of a
comparison.
Thirdly, the SEC has asked its new chief accountant to work with
the financial accounting standards board, and report back within 120
days to the commission chairman his conclusions with respect to
whether or not the present accounting treatment of stock options is
appropriate. Under the present accounting treatment, if a stock option is granted to an executive, and the exercise price of that option
is at least equal to the market price of the stock on the date the option is granted, the issuing company does not have to take any charge
against its earnings, notwithstanding the fact that if the stock price of
this stock increases, and the option becomes exercisable and is likely
exercised, that the company will in fact then at that point be issuing
below-market..price stock. If, in fact, the chief accountant recommends, and the SEC adopts, a rule that companies granting market
price or above options will take a hit to earnings on the date that
they grant the option, stock options will, I suspect, very largely, not
exclusively, but very largely become a thing of the past, and Chairman Breeden has indicated he wants to be cautious because he recognizes just how significant that could be, especially since the
shareholder activists want management to have a larger stock-related
incentive compensation, not smaller. So, look out for these three initiatives and how they're written up; they're very significant.
STEPHEN BAIN-BRIDGE

First, I think that Ken's proposal is very interesting, and perhaps
more practical than the SEC's own suggestions in this area. Let me
suggest, however, that proxy reform is much ado about nothing. I am
very skeptical of the extent to which pension funds are going to become active corporate governance players. In addition to significant
communication costs, there are a host of other costs that pension
funds face in participating in corporate governance, such as informational asymmetries between management and shareholders, coordination and collective action problems, free riding problems and the
1241

like, that will affect the ability of pension funds to participate actively in corporate governance. The political process is also likely to
constrain pension fund activism, especially for public funds. The
same corporate managers who got state takeover laws passed, after
all, will be able to get state politicians to pressure public pension
funds.
Second, with regard to executive compensation, if any of you are
representing clients who receive a Rule 14a-8 proposal dealing with
executive compensation, let me urge you to challenge the validity of
Rule 14a-8. I can't imagine anybody will actually do this, but the
Business Roundtable case opens the door for a challenge to the SEC's
authority to adopt Rule 14a-8. In particular, the Commission's recent
14a-8 decisions in the area of executive compensation mark what I regard as a substantial and unwarranted intrusion into corporate governance areas that Business Roundtable teaches are a matter for
state law.
HENRY LESSER

Well, I think that that is an issue we're going to have to watch.
Clearly the Commission has sought to address this by disclosure; in
other words, its rationale is, 'Let's at least let the shareholders get
these things on the ballot.' It is not purporting, and I think there
would be an even more serious SEC v. Business Round Table issue if
it were purporting, to actually cap executive compensation. Dan Rostenkowski, among others, is talking about legislation to actually cap
executive compensation by eliminating the deductibility for tax purposes of compensation paid to senior executives above a certain level;
Congressman Szabo has a proposal that if the top person in the corporation earns more than 25 times what the bottom person in the
corporation earns, that excess above the 25 times will not be deductible. Rostenkowski would do it with I think a flat one million dollars,
which is probably more generous than some would like. This is an
example of the explosive nature of what we're dealing with here. Do
we have any questions before lunch? At the back there.
Audience Question
Yes. This is on corporate governance, and I was directing it toward
Mr. Lesser. My question is whether the institutionalization of the
stock market that you talk about which is a big trend and you can see
it in the way that the corporate trading was around the stock market
.. . is cause for shareholders and corporations to become activist,
that's the first part; and then, if that's the case, because institutions
have been somewhat muted by SEC rules, and all these billions of
dollars of funds of individual investors are buried in these pension
1242
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funds, insurance funds... since the institutions are not allowed to be
activist, people that have all those funds in these are sort of unrepresented and that allows the boards to become more activist, and that's
sort of the two trends you talk about in your section, they go hand in
hand. What kind of laws can be created to allow the individual investors to have as much say as shareholders?
HENRY LESSER

Well, that's a very meaty, three-part question that none of us could
possibly do justice to, and I think my paper attempts to deal with
some of it. Let me just address one part of it to try to correct a
misconception.
Ken is not saying, and nor are any of us saying, that institutions
are not allowed to be activist. On the contrary, they are. In our own
great state, if you look at what CalPERS is, they are the ultimate activist institutional shareholder, until this year, when in a kinder, gentler mode, they've abandoned the program of pursuing shareholder
proposals under 14(a)(8) in favor of a different and more effective
form of activism, which is calling the chairman of IBM or the chairman of Apple Computer, and sitting down with him and saying,
"Now what are you going to do for me?" That's all going on behind
closed doors. Shareholders are allowed to be activist, they are allowed to introduce proposals, they are allowed if they have the
money to pay for their own shareholder solicitations; what they're
not allowed to do, or what is restricted, is (a) solicitation as defined
without compliance with the federal rules governing solicitation, and
(b) concerted activity among shareholders who in the aggregate own
five percent or more of the stock without filing a Schedule 13D,
which discloses exactly what they're doing. So there are some limits.
There have been some limits on the books for a long time that have
facilitated shareholder activism, and the first part of your question to
do with whether shareholder activism has made it easier for boards
to be proactive, the axiom that Steve and I have referred to-he calls
it a norm and I call it an axiom of corporate governance-has encouraged Board activism for a long time; if anything, institutional investor activism has been somewhat of a curb on Board activism
rather than a catalyst to it. Steve, do you want to comment?
Audience Comment
I disagree that the rules facilitate shareholder activism, or that
1243

they're fair or evenhanded. [In the case of] individual shareholders
in the smaller 12G company who want to do something, possibly a
single-issue campaign, these rules exert a tremendous chilling effect
on exercise of First Amendment rights, and I really think that people
on the commission staff should read the First Amendment and
maybe some of Hugo Black's writings on the First Amendment. Free
speech means free speech. I've been involved in several shareholder
organization efforts, and the rules are pro-management all the way
down the line when you're in that position.
HENRY LESSER

Comment on that?
STEPHEN BAINBRIDGE

To respond flippantly, I wonder where the SEC appears in the
Constitution. In addition to the First Amendment issue you raise,
which has been hanging out there for a long time, there is also still
the question of whether the independent agencies have any constitutional basis. So I think you raise a very valid point.
HENRY LESSER

Every one of these I chair ends up with a Commission-bashing approach, and since we're very, very pleased to have three members of
the staff-two come from D.C., one is in an individual capacity here
today-I think that we should all go and eat the attractive-looking
chocolate cake that I saw out in the cafeteria before we engage in any
more bashing.
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ROSALIND TYSON

Let me say that I am delighted to be here. Just a reminder that
both myself and John Maguire want to join in the disclaimer that
Ken Lehman gave earlier, that we are not here as representatives of
that most beloved of institutions, we are here as individuals. I will be
talking about the investment advisory industry. My job in the regional office is to manage the examination and regulation staff, and
part of our job is to examine the mutual funds headquartered here,
and the money managers and advisors headquartered in our region.
The investment industry has grown tremendously over the past ten
years and has posed a serious resource allocation dilemma for the Securities and Exchange Commission. I will outline a few proposals
that the Chairman of the SEC, Chairman Breeden, outlined last
Thursday in his testimony before Congress that would help remedy
the dilemma that we see in regulating advisors.
First of all, in general the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 defines
an investment advisor as any firm or individual who, for compensation, is engaged in the business of providing advice to others about securities or who issues reports or analyses about securities. This
definition covers a broad range of registrants from individual financial planners who prepare investment strategies on a fee-only basis,
to financial planners who are dually registered as brokers, who receive their compensation mainly from selling products which they
have in their drawer, or from a broader range of products. It covers
business managers, large and small; money managers; mutual fund
switch timers; it is a very diverse industry. There are currently
17,500 registered investment advisors. There is another universe out
there, some commentators believe, of financial planners who in fact
do give advice about securities and who technically should be registered, who are not. Some people have put that number at 20,000 to
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30,000 additional people. Of the 17,000 registrants we have now
across the country, 3,000 of them are in the region in which I carry
out my duties. This, in 1991, represents a 12,000 percent increase
over the population of registrants only ten years ago. In 1981, there
were 5,000 registrants, as opposed to 17,000 today. In 1981, there was
450 billion dollars under management by registrants; today that
number has exploded to 5.4 trillion dollars. That includes one and a
half trillion dollars of investment company assets, as well as money
outside investment companies.
Now, when you look at the segments of the industry that need to
be regulated, it's important to remember that approximately fifty
percent of the 17,000 registrants have only one employee, and have
no assets under management. Those are the financial planners. Of
the 17,500 registrants, a small number relatively speaking, eight hundred fifty registered advisors, have any substantial amount of assets
under management. Eight hundred fifty registrants have at least
half a billion dollars under management. Nevertheless, for the SEC
to try to inspect even those is a stretch of the resources that we have.
The current program under the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 for
regulating this industry provides simply for a $150 fee to register...
it's the last thing you can be for a hundred and fifty dollars. The registration form that you fill out and send in to the SEC automatically
becomes effective in 45 days, unless we take action to stop it. The
program next envisions that there will be periodic inspections by
SEC examiners. However, therein lies the dilemma: the SEC staff
responsible for examining advisors has not kept pace with the explosive growth of the investment advisor industry. In 1981, there were
thirty-six nationwide staff years devoted to inspecting advisors, in
1991, forty-six, an increase of twenty-eight percent over ten years, as
opposed to the industry growth of 12,000 percent in assets under
management. This obviously poses a serious under-inspection problem. The general accounting office, the GAO, did a study at Congress' request, and issued a report in June of 1990. The title says it
all: Current Level of Oversight Puts Investors at Risk. They went
around to several offices, regional offices, ours included, and counted
up how many advisors there were and how long had it been since
we'd been in there to do an inspection, how we structured our program, etc., and they found that at that time, under the program we
were operating under, it was at least twelve years, or an average of
twelve years between inspections for advisors, which meant that
many were never inspected at all. Rather than examine a mix of two
hundred fifty money managers and financial planners in the Los Angeles region every year, which was a losing battle anyway since more
registered every year than we could examine, we have shifted our focus to examining advisors with the most assets under management,
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and those who have discretionary power or custody in possession of
investor assets. That allows us to inspect a large percentage of assets
under management. While only three percent of advisors were inspected last year, thirty percent of the assets under management
were managed by those advisors, so that over a three-year period, the
plan is to have actually covered almost ninety percent of the assets
under management through our program. Unfortunately that leaves
us, for the rest of the advisors, with a thirty-year time span between
exams. There are no resources left over to go and examine financial
planners. That is regrettable, and investors are at risk, because as
the GAO study has pointed out, and as Chairman Breeden has
pointed out, as well as numerous others, when investors see that
their advisor is registered with the SEC, they envision a number of
things. Perhaps investors believe that these advisers are being inspected, that they have some competence, or that they have met
some qualification requirements, and perhaps none of those are true.
There is a high-profile case which we have recently brought in the
Los Angeles regional office; I know at least one person in the audience who's intensely interested in it, as I am. This is the Steven
Wymer case: Institutional Treasury Management. Here was an advisor who, over the period of about five years, had gone from managing
almost no assets to managing 1.2 billion dollars of assets, all from
small municipalities or from pooled trusts of small municipalities.
Wymer's niche was that he would take investors' surplus funds, their
payroll funds, their cemetery management funds, or whatever, and
invest them in government treasury securities, and get them a one to
two percent higher return than they could get anywhere else. However, we discovered that about a hundred million dollars was not
there. Right at the moment, we have a staff of examiners from our
office locked in a room in the Federal Building downtown with one
hundred and fifty boxes of documents, and some more documents
they're collecting from the broker in New York, trying to figure out
where the money went. We hope we'll see them back in the office
one of these days, but this is definitely a gargantuan project. The
fraud tells us about what can happen, and why additional scrutiny is
probably justified in this investment advisory industry. I'll spend just
a few more minutes telling you about the case, because it's sort of an
amazing story. Steven Wymer, by the way, was indicted January 2nd
on thirty counts of fraud; he is currently out on bail with an electronic surveillance bracelet on his ankle, and can't be more than one
hundred fifty feet away from his phone, except to visit his attorney
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or go to church. Federal prosecutors have confiscated about 15 million dollars of assets of his, including thirteen cars, four homes, several other properties, four boats, the list goes on. But that is a drop
in the bucket of the 100 million dollars that is missing.
To our credit, our staff actually found this fraud before it collapsed
of its own weight. No one tipped us off that this particular fraud existed. We did have a complaint letter asking about the risk involved
in options for Marshalltown, Iowa. This advisor was trading options
for Marshalltown, Iowa, and the complainant questioned whether options were actually an authorized investment for the city. We went
and did a "cause" exam of the advisor, and it took us a little while,
because we were initially focusing of course on "What's the options
trading going on here, and is it authorized by the city?" However, we
did not stop there, and we did eventually do some additional checking. We went directly to the broker, we got the trading record, and
compared it to the account statement that Steven Wymer was sending to the City of Marshalltown, which showed that they had a cash
balance of six million dollars at Refco, plus three million dollars in
treasury securities, and that they were doing one to two options
trades a month that were nicely profitable for the city. Wymer was
making a performance-based fee: thirty percent of any profits that
Marshalltown made would go to Wymer. When we compared this
scenario that Wymer was presenting to Marshalltown with the actual
brokerage records, we found a vastly different story. We found that
there was a total of about $100,000 in the account, not the six million
in cash and securities. We found that there had been hundreds of
bond trades over a several-month period, none of which had been disclosed to Marshalltown, and which cumulatively were losing money.
Anyway, that caused us to get a temporary restraining order and asset freeze all of Wymer's client money. So for about ten days, there
was a temporary receiver appointed, and we were sitting on 1.2 billion dollars in assets of people who wanted their money. That was
quite a lot of pressure, and basically what the receiver did was to
count up the money that was in the accounts and look at what clients
thought they had, and what the custodians actually had. In fact, most
of the money was there. There was only 100 million missing. The
100 million missing was primarily or almost exclusively from twelve
municipal accounts who had no formal custodian agreement, who had
permitted the broker to send account statements directly to Wymer,
not directly to the customer. They depended totally on Wymer for
all of their information, and of course, he took their money. Now,
the receiver released the money to the other accounts, where there
was money, with the understanding or with the express statement
that, their getting the money was without prejudice to any claims
that the SEC or other clients of Wymer might have. We are pres1248
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ently now in the disgorgement phase of the SEC's proceeding. We
obtained a permanent injunction against Wymer earlier this month,
and we are now looking at coming up with a figure for disgorgement
or penalties against Wymer, which is why we have these six people
downtown with one hundred and fifty boxes of documents and six
computers. But we're attempting to discover whether, possibly, the
money from the Refco account customers was put into other client
accounts to make up, possibly, trading profits which he actually
couldn't deliver, but which he had promised to all of his clients. So
we're going to be working on that for awhile, and the U.S. Attorney
will also be proceeding with the criminal case at the same time.
The fact that this type of large-scale fraud even exists is, I think,
an important argument that we try to find some better solution for
examining advisors than we have found so far. Several solutions
have been proposed; one in the past was that the SEC exempt small
advisors from federal regulation and registration, and let the states
take over. That proposal did not meet with a lot of success. States
were responding that they did not have the resources to examine all
of these small advisors either. Another proposal several years ago
that the SEC made to Congress was that Congress establish a selfregulatory organization for this industry, as broker/dealers have the
National Association of Securities Dealers. There is no corresponding SRO for this industry, and the NASD was willing to take on this
task. The SRO proposal, which would have required Congressional
action, did not proceed. Several objections were made, not the least
of which was that this would add another layer of cost and bureaucracy to the system that was not necessary. Many people or some
people felt that perhaps the SEC should do the examining, and might
be able to do it more cost effectively. Last Thursday, February 20,
Chairman Breeden presented a proposal to Congress, again for Congressional action, which would impose a fee, an annual fee, on every
registrant, ranging from a small fee of $300 per year for eighty percent of the advisors, up to a maximum of about $7,000 a year for
those who have five billion or more under management. This fee, according to the staff's calculations, would net us an amount which
would permit us to examine all registrants: the biggest ones, every
three years, and everyone else, once every five years, so that we
would have some reasonable cycle of exams, and have a source of
funding to do it. The fees would go into a trust fund, which would be
used by the SEC for this program. I think that that sounds like a
great idea, but it requires congressional action in an election year, so
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we'll have to see what happens. I think I'd better keep my remarks
brief; I'm probably already over my time.
JOHN MAGUIRE

Well, I think I'd like to continue with the SEC praising in my remarks as opposed to the bashing that occasionally goes on with respect to the commission. The remarks I'm going to be speaking on
today, for my own purposes I find them very interesting and exciting,
yet you may not because it doesn't impact your own practice. For my
own purposes, it does impact it; I've been working in this area on
rules and proposals for the last year and a half, so I've devoted a significant amount of time, both personal and Commission staff time as

well.
The beginning of the final decade of this century has seen tremendous changes not only in the political environment in which we live,
but also in the developing international environment which the U.S.
capital markets operate. In my remarks this afternoon, I would
briefly like to outline the developing international environment in
which the U.S. capital markets operate, and what I believe is the Securities and Exchange Commission's response to the internationalization of the world's securities markets in the corporate finance area,
which is the area that I work in.
For the past several years, the term "internationalization of the securities markets" is probably one of the most publicized and discussed financial trends in the United States; only to be superseded by
the discussion that went on the previous panel; corporate governance
now seems to take up a bit more time in the press than internationalization does. But during the '70s and '80s, the internationalization of
the securities markets have been driven by what I believe are a
number of factors. Many corporations sought to enter markets
outside their home country, or state of incorporation, to compete in
the global marketplace, in order to increase their market share, revenues and profits. But most importantly, technological advances have
also provided a major thrust toward the internationalization of the
markets. With technological advances, corporations have sought to
increase their presence in these foreign markets, and investors,
whether individuals or institutions that we've heard about today,
have become acutely aware and interested in acquiring the securities
of the most profitable enterprises in order to diversify their own
portfolio investments. In many respects, the issues raised by the internationalization of the securities markets are the same for every
market, regardless of size, complexity and volume. A market supervisory oversight in enforcement regulations, clearance and settlement
systems, capital standards and, most important for purposes today,
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disclosure and financial reporting requirements, should be fundamental aspects of every market. Although the standards for governing these elementary requirements arise in different contexts,
both established and emerging markets face the same questions:
What trading, clearance and settlement systems, and reporting requirements will work most efficiently on a national and international
foundation? What information should a bidder or an issuer be required to disclose? What are the common prerequisites that must exist in order to facilitate international transactions between issuers of
different countries?
Both established and emerging markets also face broader questions. From my discussion, and my remarks today, though, the most
important is how much or how little government regulation is appropriate or politically feasible with respect to the facilitation of international tender and exchange offers. No matter how much we would
like to think that the political environment shouldn't play a role in
the financial markets, it oftentimes does.
The last decade, more than any other time in the world's economic
and financial history, has seen an explosive and dramatic growth in
the internationalization of the world's securities markets. Securities
markets around the world have become increasingly global as foreign
investors expand their use of the U.S. capital markets, domestic issuers increase their use of the foreign markets themselves, and tender
and exchange offers are made internationally. While at one time it
was possible to discuss the U.S. capital markets from a predominately
domestic vantage point, this is really no longer possible. And
although I think most staff members at the Commission and persons
that work in the financial community, or for the securities bar, would
like to believe that the U.S. capital markets remain the largest, the
fairest, and most innovative in the world, we must now recognize the
driving force of international trends in the financial industry.
For example, in fiscal year 1990, thirty-three tender offers worth
approximately $18 billion were commenced by foreign bidders in the
United States for the securities of issuers registered with the Commission. U.S. investors purchased $130 billion in foreign equities in
1990, a more than tenfold increase over 1980. For the first nine
months of 1991, U.S. investors made total net purchases of $25 billion.
This amount is nearly double the previous record of $13 billion set in
1989. With net purchases in the third quarter, U.S. investors have extended their succession of adding to their overseas equity holdings to
thirteen consecutive quarters. Aggregate holdings by U.S. persons of
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overseas stocks rose forty percent to almost $125 billion from $89 billion at the year-end of 1990.
The prospect of a unified European market this year has also led to
a significant amount of multinational investing in acquisitions within
the European community itself. In 1990, EC companies made themselves $51 billion in acquisitions of other EC companies. In the past,
a significant majority of this activity was focused on the United Kingdom because of their capital markets being in a much more advanced
stage than many of the other European countries, but other countries
such as France and Germany have begun to increase their cross-border purchases versus prior years. For example, French companies in
1991 entered into two hundred twenty cross-border transactions
throughout the EC worth $12.5 billion. In comparison, in the U.S.
last year we only had about thirty tender offers made between U.S.
companies.
So what does this hold for international tender and exchange offers? The Commission in the past has recognized that conflicting
regulations of international tender and exchange offers is a significant and increasing problem. As noted above, as corporations become
international in their operations and marketing, their security base in
many instances has also become international in stature. A result of
the globalization of the capital markets, and the desire to expand, is
an increase in corporate acquisitions in order to accomplish the desired penetration into the foreign market. However, by penetrating a
foreign market in this manner, a corporation necessarily implicates
laws of more than one country because of the international shareholder base, and the foreign domicile of the target corporation.
The core of the problem is essentially the nature and the degree of
the legal protection that should be afforded to security holders in international tender and exchange offers, at least from a regulatory
standpoint. For most of the 20th century, international security regulation in general has been perceived as offering a different and less
desirable form of protection due to the perceived lack of quality.
While the United States has favored regulation emphasizing rules
governing the securities distribution, trading processes and disclosure, most other countries, especially those in western Europe have
endorsed rules regulating the organization of the corporation as opposed to the organization of the securities market. Securities regulation by the various international regulatory authorities in the '90s
and beyond, I believe, will turn on answers to two significant
questions.
First, how much and how quickly should the U.S. regulatory system change in response to the significant cross-border capital movements and the economic integration going on throughout the world
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at this time? And second, with regard to regulating international
capital movements, and international transactions, what should the
appropriate legal standard be: national treatment, reciprocity, or
some other treatment?
As we all know, the securities regulation in the United States is
conducted under laws that were promulgated in the early 1930s, with
only minor amendments since that time. Historically, the U.S. capital markets have been viewed as self-contained and dominant, a view
that today ignores reality. However, this historical view has fostered
a belief that U.S. investors, wherever they may be, or wherever they
may have invested, need the protections afforded by the federal securities laws. With this in mind, the starting point for any discussion
on international tender and exchange offers is jurisdiction, and the
extraterritorial application of the federal securities laws.
The territorial principle of jurisdiction provides that a state has the
power to proscribe, adjudicate and enforce rules of law for the conduct that occurs within its own territory, essentially what is known
as the "conducts test," or for conduct which occurs outside the territory, but which has effects within the territory, essentially what has
become known as the "effects test." Jurisdiction, though, should be
measured by its reasonableness in light of various factors, such as the
party's contacts and links with the forum court, and their justified
expectations. 'Unless this is the case, multinational corporations
would be subject to potentially multiple conflicting rules of law. For
my own purposes, with respect to the Williams Act, which is the area
that I work in, and for that matter the anti-fraud provisions of the
Exchange Act, which are probably the most important to international corporations, as applied to an international tender and exchange offer, the Commission has previously stated that jurisdiction
will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. It's not a
very bright line test that people can go to the bank with.., but it has
been the Commission's view that if we do create a bright line test,
because lawyers are creative, they'll create ways to get around that
bright line test. The U.S. courts have backed up the Commission in
most respects, and have found that jurisdiction over extraterritorial
conduct in general by using the two previously stated standards, the
conduct test and the effects test... in this way, the U.S. courts have
given a broad interpretation to the jurisdictional provisions of the Exchange Act in order to "protect domestic investors [who] have
purchased foreign securities on American exchanges, and to protect
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the domestic securities market from the effects of improper foreign
transactions in American securities."
The Commission, however, in the past has recognized that the jurisdictional reach of the Williams Act is not unlimited. We like to
think of ourselves as being astute, and in most instances have declined to require a number of corporations to make or extend the offer into the United States. In the context of the Securities Act, for
registration of securities in an exchange offer, the Commission has
since 1964 declined to exercise its regulatory authority and jurisdiction with respect to a securities distribution that is "affected in -a
manner abroad." Even where the federal securities law may have
been triggered by the use of the jurisdictional means.
In order to clarify this extraterritorial reach of the securities act,
the Commission recently adopted Regulation S,and in adopting the
regulation, the Commission took a territorial approach to the enforcement of Section 5 of the Securities Act, by establishing a nonexclusive safe harbor for those parties that desire to make a transaction solely abroad. However, it should be noted that the Commission,
in adopting the regulation, emphatically stated that this territorial
approach would not affect the broad reach of the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws.
In this context, the regulatory framework for the application of the
Williams Act in international tender and exchange offers, which also
was conceived primarily for domestic application, I believe should be
understood in a similar fashion to the Commission's policy expressed
in Regulation S. Consequently, when a foreign corporation extends a
tender offer for the shares of another foreign entity, the applicability
of the Williams Act should turn on the extent to which the conduct
in question occurs, or affects the United States or U.S. investors.
Thus a foreign bidder should be permitted to avoid the application of
the federal securities laws if and only if permitted by the home jurisdiction, by tailoring the terms of the transaction to minimize its context with the United States which, for most of the late '80s and early
'90s most corporations have done.
The way this has been accomplished is by ensuring that tender offer materials are not mailed to U.S. shareholders, or a U.S. shareholder is not allowed to use the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce and mail the tender offer document back to the home jurisdiction of the target corporation, wherever that may be. In such a
manner, a foreign bidder, by excluding U.S. persons, avoids the jurisdiction of the U.S. courts, but only so long as U.S. holdings of the target are not substantial.
I'd like to make the point that although this occurs often, from my
own standpoint and I think from the Commission's, it's not a desira1254
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ble result. Instead, the Commission during the '80s has essentially
taken it upon itself to make a concerted effort to address the globalization and the integration of the financial markets around the world.
The Commission, through its rule-making ability, has attempted to
accommodate the various international policy issues that arise as the
world's securities markets have become interdependent. Inasmuch as
complete cooperative regulation may be a long-term goal, requiring a
long period of transition by the international regulatory authorities,
more immediate measures should be considered which resolve current problems and point in the direction of cooperative regulation,
and the harmonization of various methods of regulating securities
markets. The Commission in the '90s has taken some small, and
some large, strides toward cooperative regulation and a more reciprocal approach to the application of the federal securities laws. An example of the cooperative approach is the recent adoption of the
multijurisdictional disclosure system with Canada. What we refer to
as the MJDS has attempted, among other things, to harmonize minimum disclosure and procedural requirements for simultaneous multinational securities offerings, tender and exchange offers, and
business combinations in the United States and Canada. The Commission in adopting the MJDS has taken a significant step by permitting Canadian corporations to use disclosure documents and offering
documents adopted by the Canadian authorities for compliance with
the Commission's rules and regulations. This is pretty much an unprecedented step in the Commission's history, since the Commission
has essentially always mandated that issuers comply with our own
rules and regulations.
More specifically for our aspect today, the Commission published
for comment last June proposed rules, order, and forms that would
permit tender offers for a foreign issuer's securities to proceed in the
United States on the basis of the applicable regulation of the target's
home country, where a small percentage of those shares are held
here in the United States, whether they are registered with the Commission pursuant to Section 12, or were purchased on an exchange in
one of the foreign countries. The rules, forms and order proposed
would permit single jurisdiction regulation with respect to both the
tender offer and registration requirements, so that international
tender and exchange offers can be made, and they can be made hopefully more efficiently and at less expense. In proposing the international tender and exchange offers, the release suggests that the
Commission is very concerned with working out a reciprocal ap1255

proach that would permit these offers to be made here and be made
to U.S. holders, instead of what we view as the more troublesome of
excluding them. With that result, shareholders have to make a decision as to whether to sell into the market with either no information
or very little information with respect to the offer.
The most troublesome aspect of the international tender and exchange offer release, from the commentator's point of view though, is
the continued application of the anti-fraud provisions of the Exchange Act, and the civil liabilities that would continue to apply to
the form that was proposed for registration of those securities here in
the United States. As presently set forth, the anti-fraud provisions
would continue to apply, much as they continue to apply to any
transaction that relies on Regulation S that is undertaken today.
Foreign purchasers may well continue to avoid extending offers into
the United States because of this concern, rather than because of concerns about certain line item requirements. Unfortunately, because
the anti-fraud provisions are statutorily based, the Commission is
under no power to change those rules unless it goes before Congress
to have them change it, and in the days of Japan-bashing and other
aspects of our foreign trade, I'm not quite sure that that would be a
decision that Congress would want to make at this time.
I'd like to say in conclusion that corporations and their shareholders have become international in character during the '80s and the
'90s, and countries vary widely, not only in their requirements as to
takeovers but also in their application of their takeover requirements
to offers for target corporations incorporated in their jurisdictions or
in a foreign jurisdiction. A number of regulators take the view that
investors need the same protections they would be entitled to have,
had the offer been made entirely in that country-national treatment, or what is referred to as the U.S. viewpoint. Other regulators
are of the view that investors making portfolio investments outside
their territorial boundaries should be prepared to be governed by the
rules and regulations of that country of incorporation-reciprocity, or
the European viewpoint. Until there is greater international harmonization of policies, though, the international tender and exchange
offer will continue to be a legal nightmare for purchasers, but a significant source of employment for international securities lawyers.
The recent initiatives by the Commission, the takeover panel in the
UK and the Canadian authorities have been helpful in solving the
regulatory headaches caused by international tender or exchange offers. But they are only a first step in what will surely be a long
process.
However, as the Commission gains further knowledge and understanding of the rules and regulations governed by foreign regulatory
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authorities, hopefully in the future we'll be able to make certain decisions that have to be made, the rules that we propose will hopefully
be adopted soon, and will be a small step in facilitating these transactions in the future. Thank you.
BRYANT EDWARDS

Good afternoon. I'm happy to be here. To understand corporate
reorganizations in America today, you have to understand one little
sentence tucked in one provision of the Trust Indenture Act. Section
316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act requires that qualified indentures
contain a provision that prohibits an issuer from making changes to
fundamental payment terms-that is, changes in interest rate, principal and maturity-without the consent of each affected bond holder.
In order to amend the payment terms of an entire issue of debt securities, therefore, an issuer must obtain the consent of all the bond
holders. Because a typical issue of bonds may be held by dozens or
thousands of bond holders, such amendments are virtually impossible. Unlike many provisions of the Trust Indenture Act, this one
can't be contracted around. And, if you think about it, it's a remarkable restriction on the freedom of a borrower and its lenders to contract freely. Bank agreements typically will have a majority action
provision that permits a majority of the banks in the syndicate to
make a number of changes, including, in some cases, fundamental
payment changes. Public bond holders can't do that. And, like most
regulations, this is one that I believe has had the exact opposite of
the intended effect: it hurts bond holders. This restriction is particularly troublesome for companies that get into financial trouble. Even
if a financially troubled issuer can reach agreement with the majority
of its bond holders to a consensual restructuring, it still faces a severe
holdout problem. Bond holders who don't participate in a voluntary
exchange get to retain their bonds (with the original payment terms)
in a company whose health has been rehabilitated because of the financial concessions of the other bond holders. In effect, the participating bond holders are transferring wealth to the non-participating
holders. While holdouts are irritating to issuers, they are highly objectionable to other bond holders. That's a real obstacle to effectuating restructurings out of court.
The Bankruptcy Code of 1978 solved this problem by including provisions that permitted confirmation of a plan of reorganization that
binds an entire class of bond holders with the approval of one-half of
the holders if they own two-thirds of the principal amount of the
1257

bonds. That means that if a company achieves substantial agreement
with the bond holders, it can use Chapter 11 to require all bond holders to accept the terms of such agreement. The problem is that an
unstructured Chapter 11 is often a disaster, especially for the bond
holders. Eastern Airlines is a good example. The Chapter 11 reorganization of Eastern was recently converted to a straight Chapter 7
liquidation, but not before bond holders lost 2.2 billion dollars that
was sqandered in an ill-fated attempt to operate Eastern for the benefit of the flying public for an eighteen-month period. LTV is another example of a disastrous Chapter 11 proceeding. It filed for
relief under Chapter 11 in June of 1986, and five years later it still
had not proposed a plan of reorganization. LTV senior bonds, which
were trading at about $85 at the time of the Chapter 11 filing, are
now trading at about $10.
The Bankruptcy Code's superior legal features have prompted the
development of new techniques, one of which is called a "prepackaged" bankruptcy. A prepackaged bankruptcy is an attempt is to
marry the benefits of a consensual out-of-court restructuring with
the superior legal benefits of the Bankruptcy Code. In a prepackaged
plan, an issuer will propose a plan of reorganization, solicit the requisite creditor and shareholder approvals, and file for Chapter 11 relief
only after it has received all the consents it requires to confirm a
Chapter 11 plan. The idea is to get in and out of Chapter 11 quickly
with the least amount of harm to the underlying business. The technique has been successful in a number of cases. JPS Textile was in
and out of Chapter 11 in forty days; Southland was in and out in
about four months. However, the prepackaged plan approach, which
is the current rage, has a number of problems. First, when you file
for relief under Chapter 11, your trade creditors are out of luck because their payments are suspended until the plan is approved or
other orders are entered. An issuer that solicits a Chapter 11 plan
may scare the trade. The suppliers and the vendors that keep the
company in business get worried. If trade credit dries up, the company's financial condition could worsen further. There are other
risks. After Southland had solicited all the consents to its prepackaged plan and was in Chapter 11, the judge determined that even
though the plan had been solicited in compliance with existing bankruptcy rules, it had been improperly solicited because such rules
were inadequate. The court required the company to resolicit the entire deal. Fortunately, Southland was successful, but one can easily
foresee dangerous resolicitation scenarios. If the deal that a company
had struck with the bond holders does not survive the resolicitation,
the issuer would be stuck in an unstructured Chapter 11, which could
ruin the business.
Another problem is the SEC. In a prepackaged plan, even though
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a company has to deal with the bankruptcy court, it generally also
has to be declared effective by the SEC. Before Chapter 11, an issuer
doesn't have the benefit of Section 1145, which exempts offers and
sales of securities after a Chapter 11 filing. Therefore, pre-Chapter
11 offers have to be done pursuant to a registration statement or an
exemption. The SEC has been all over the restructurings, and I believe this has interfered with the ability of companies to work out
their debt. For example, in Southland, the company receives sixteen
rounds of comments (totaling more than four hundred comments)
over an eleven-month period, from the time it filed until it went effective on its registration statement. Forest Oil had four amendments. Las Colinas, which was another big prepackaged plan, had six
amendments over a six-month period before it went effective; Republic Health had six amendments over a twenty-three-month period
before it was able to go effective. Issuers have enough trouble dealing with a troubled business, their creditors and other constituencies
without having to deal with hundreds of SEC comments. Most of the
bond holders in these deals are big institutional holders and they can
fend for themselves; regulatory delay hurts their intents directly.
All of this has caused consideration of other legal techniques for
reorganizing companies. One idea was to use a class action lawsuit
under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a vehicle
for restructuring companies without ever having to file for bankruptcy. Some class actions permit class members to opt out, but in
other types a court will certify a binding or mandatory plaintiff class,
meaning that every member of the class is bound by the results of
the lawsuit, including a settlement of the lawsuit. Mandatory class
action lawsuits, are particularly appropriate in certain situations. For
example, where there is a risk that separate lawsuits would produce
inconsistent and impossible obligations on the defendant party, a
mandatory class is appropriate. An example was a lawsuit brought
by some bond holders against Burlington Northern Railroad. In that
case, a $117-million issue of non-callable bonds issued in 1896 was secured by property which by the 1980s was worth billions of dollars.
The company wanted to release the lien and substitute collateral
with a value more appropriate for such an issue, but that violated the
indenture. The bond holders sued, and the court certified a
mandatory class because if every bond holder went into court separately, the issuer might be subject to different injunctive orders that
might very well be inconsistent. Another appropriate use of a
mandatory class is where there are multiple claimants to a limited
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fund, such as an insurance fund, or a limited pool of assets. We believe that a suit by bond holders to effectuate a distressed company
restructuring falls into that line of limited-fund cases, because there
is a limited pool of assets and a need for an equitable distribution of
those assets. Generally, actions for injunctive or declaratory relief
can be certified as mandatory, non-opt out class actions. However,
the use of mandatory class actions as a restructuring technique raises
additional questions. For example, do federal courts have the power
to bind a class of bond holders to a settlement that impairs their payment obligations notwithstanding the Trust Indenture Act? After
some consideration, we think the answer to that is yes. It goes to the
fundamental, equitable jurisdiction of the federal court. An examination of Rule 23 shows that mandatory class actions under Rule 23
had their historical origins in an equitable remedy called the Bill of
Peace, an equitable remedy meant to avoid a multiplicity of lawsuits.
This was the same equitable remedy that served as the foundation
for thousands of railroad reorganizations at the turn of the century.
These cases are. interesting because federal courts in the United
States reorganized most of the railroads in the country without ever
going into bankruptcy. They did this through a technique called equity receiverships. In an equity receivership, a friendly creditor
would sue the company after it didn't get paid, and obtain the appointment of equity receiver. The company would consent to the appointment, and through the receiver's power of sale, would effectuate
a reorganization. From the early 1990s till about 1923, federal courts
issued a series of opinions that clearly established the power of a federal court to effectuate reorganizations that were binding on all bond
holders, including dissenting bond holders. Although the Trust Indenture Act was adopted in 1939, we don't believe that the Act
changed this result. First, the legislative history of the Trust Indenture Act indicates that William 0. Douglas, who was the principal author, wanted to assume that reorganizations occur under the
supervision of federal courts; he didn't seem to care that it was bankruptcy versus an ordinary federal judge. Second, 316(b) of the Trust
Indenture Act required nothing more than what in 1939 was in most
American indentures. Most American indentures, because of concerns about negotiability, already had a provision that provided that
an issuer can't change fundamental payment terms without individual consent. We also think that the class action technique passes
Constitutional scrutiny; the contract impairment clause is one provision that comes to mind, but a look at the clause and the case law
shows that the clause restricts state-but not federal-action. Due
process is another consideration, but we think that if you follow the
Rule 23 procedures, you've satisfied the due process requirements.
And the icing on the cake here is that by settling a federal class ac1260
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tion lawsuit, you can take advantage of Section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Act, which exempts the whole thing from Securities Act
registration. 'It provides an exemption for issuances of securities
whose terms have been approved by a court after a fairness hearing.
In conclusion, we think that by avoiding both the SEC and the bankruptcy courts, the class action restructuring technique has a chance
of better effectuating a consensual arrangement between an issuer
and its bond holders.
JOHN MAGUIRE

I'd like to quickly say that although I worked on the Southland
transaction, I only dealt with the Williams Act aspect of it, and then
also I think in deference to the staff attorney that did work on it, the
Southland transaction was essentially the first prepackaged plan that
came into the Commission. I think that because of the amounts of
money involved, and the newness of the issues, we did not have the
time period that Latham & Watkins and others working on the transaction had prior to going to the Commission, so we had to come up to
speed on the transaction.
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Let me start the timer here. I don't want to keep at it any longer
than I'm allotted. A collateral participant is a secondary defendant.
Typically when a plaintiff in a securities action files against the issuer, the issuer is judgment-proof. So, if you use a sports metaphor,
the name of the game is kind of "rope a dope." So the plaintiff
names the lawyer, the tax lawyer, the banker, the directors, the general partner, the officers, the celebrity spokesperson-we call that
the "Pat Boone" defendant-or Beau Bridges' father, what was his
name?
What the plaintiff attempts to do is work the "prisoner's dilemma,"
because these defendants are all represented by lawyers, and of
course, lawyers are macho. They don't want to cooperate with one
another. The plaintiff will take a round of depositions, find out
which defendants have some culpability, but are less culpable than
others, and pick them off, and obtain a good settlement. The bank is
always a good place to start, because that's where the money is. The
plaintiff then fattens his or her war chest, and then proceeds, works
the prisoner's dilemma, maybe settles out against two of the directors, and the like. The key for defendants is to cooperate, but they
never do.
I did an empirical study of securities litigation filed in the Western
District of Washington in 1980 and 1981. The most common phenomenon actually is a single defendant: it is securities firms' collection actions that are filed in federal court, and SEC enforcement of
subpoenas. But the second-most common phenomenon is this type of
action. I've found that the median range of collateral participant defendants was ten to fourteen defendants.
Now the way, legally, plaintiffs-I have a plaintiffs' bias, so I'd better put that right out in front-the way plaintiffs proceeded after
these defendants originally was an aiding and abetting allegation
under rule 10b-5. That changed of course with Ernst & Ernst v.
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Hochfelder in 1976, which said that you have to prove scienter but
left open the question whether recklessness would suffice. Later federal court decisions have held that recklessness but only of the highconscious disregard sort will suffice. And still later, at least as to secondary defendants, federal courts have been holding that knowledge
is the state of mind requirement for aiding and abetting.
After Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, attention then shifted to the
1933 Act. Section 12(2) has been discussed a lot today. One proxy for
the change in activity was that in all the law reviews and periodicals
after Hochfelder-I think there was one aiding and abetting article,
and maybe a dozen all on so-called participation, or expanded seller
status, under Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933.
Now that train pulled on the siding with the 1988 Supreme Court
decision in Pinterv. Dahl, Pinterv. Dahl held that to pinion liability
on an expanded seller theory, the collateral participant had to have
engaged in the sales transaction or participated in the solicitation,
with some benefit, potential benefit redounding to them, and probably that they had to have done so at or around the temporal time of
sale. That development really cut off the ability to name collateral
participants in federal cases.
The attention now is shifting to state securities law. Before Pinter
v. Dahl, there were maybe two or three good collateral participant
cases reported opinions under state securities laws; since 1988 there
are at least 15 reported decisions. What do we find when we look at
those decisions? Well, I had to write a seventy-two-page article that I
thought was going to be about twenty pages. We find a patchwork.
Very difficult to sum up.
We find that some are very broad. Oregon has a 1988 decision interpreting its securities secondary liability statute, a version of the
Uniform Securities Act Oregon has modified. Oregon's statute says
literally anyone who "materially aids or participates" in the violation
is also liable. But Oregon courts had always tempered that with the
state of mind requirement; they required knowledge, if you read your
cases. But Judge Hans Linde, in his precise way, said there is no
knowledge requirement on the face of the statute, so a lawyer who
drafted documents, provided what could be considered routine legal
services, was held liable. That's the case Princev. Brydon case in Oregon. The organized bar has attempted to overrule it, but they have
not been able to do so.
The other extreme is California. You're safe in California. If you
do an office practice, you're very safe because the California courts,
mainly federal courts, interpreting California's securities laws, have
held it requires strict privity. The only person who can be liable
when there's a low state of mind is the issuer, essentially-almost a
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passing of title. privity. The decisions are not clear whether it's a
passing of title, or a very narrow transactional privity, but the liability is very constrained in California. If you want to reach a a collateral participant, there is a provision of the California Corporations
Code section 25504.1, that says anyone who "materially aids or participates" can be held liable, but a plaintiff must prove intent to deceive
or defraud-this is very tough to prove. So the state law cases are all
over the place.
I have to make a disclaimer: the foremost expert on state securities
laws in the United States is Mark Sargent, so I'll have to defer to him
on anything that I say, and he can jump up and bop me over the head
if I go astray. ] get into these cases a lot, as a consultant, expert witness-I've done perhaps fifteen cases. I have done cases involving ski
resorts, fishing boats with crews, Norwegian red bulls, airplane deals,
apple orchards, wine grapes, wheat farms, Christmas trees, semitruck trailers with drivers. For the most part, they're being filed as
state securities actions. The avenue is closed off on the federal level,
but potentially the avenue is open on the state level. The benefits on
the state level are, one, you get attorneys' fees under most state securities laws. Under the states' general anti-fraud rules, the scienter
standard is probably negligence. All the courts that have faced that
issue have decided that negligence will suffice; the open question is
whether there's implication of a private right of action under the
anti-fraud rule, or whether the express civil liability provision is
exclusive.
The question, then, post-Pinter v. Dahl, is will states adopt that
case as their own law of how far they will expand seller status?
Three or four intermediate appellate courts have done that. Zindel
v. Newport Oil, in New Jersey in 1988, State v. Williams, North Carolina Appellate, 1990, Allen v. Columbia Financial,South Carolina,
1988. Now, of course, I should back up-what we're talking about is
the Uniform Securities Act of 1956, or the new one, which is 1985.
About forty states have that statute, thirty-nine or forty. It's neither
uniform-I guess it is securities-but it is not a very uniform "uniform" act. Under that act, at least two state supreme courts, on the
other hand, have refused to follow the narrower Dahl approach. The
Ridenour case in Kansas, and Washington Supreme Court, three
times refuse to apply Pinterv. Dahl. Of course we had the ultimate
collateral participant liability case in Washington-the WPPS litigation, Washington Power & Public Supply-seven hundred seventy
named defendamts, five hundred John and Jane Doe defendants.
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Depositions were held in auditoriums in New York. Whole 747s of
lawyers were flying back and forth... those were the days ....
The question, then, is if states refuse to follow Dahl, what approach will they adopt, or what approach should they adopt to expanded seller status? And then, what policy arguments support
expanded seller status, and what policy arguments oppose it? Probably the test that you'll see states adopting is the version of the prePinterv. Dahl approach, that is, was the collateral participant a substantial factor or, in the words of the Washington Supreme Court,
was it a "substantial contributive factor," in the transaction constituting the violation? The difficulty with that approach, and I have articulated this in an article in the 1986 Oregon Law Review on
collateral participant liability under federal law, the difficulty is they
don't say, or they use differing terminology as "substantial contributive factor." In what? In the sale? In the solicitation? In the violation? In the transaction? And we find the courts intermixing all
those terms. In Washington we have three decisions now, post-Pinter
v. Dahl: State v. Hoffer II, Heves v. Data Line Processing, and
Schmidt v. Cornerstone, Inc. The Washington court reconsidered
Hoffer I after Pinterv. Dahl came down. And the Washington court
confuses the terminology. Substantial factor in what? If you say substantial factor in the transaction, is the printer a substantial factor in
the transaction? Is the paralegal in the law firm, who did a lot of the
legwork, is he or she a substantial factor in the transaction?
The second problem is that courts have said, "Well, our test of substantial factor is the tort law test of proximate cause." But then the
federal courts have always said, "Well, the test of proximate cause is
substantial factor." And substantial factor, of course, is only the test
of cause in fact. A tort law analysis proceeds to a further narrowing,
given that it's a substantial factor, cause in fact, is it the proximate
cause?
Washington courts have refused to follow Pinterv. Dahl. Oregon
courts have refused to follow Pinterv. Dahl. Kansas courts have refused. Their reasoning is that state securities law is to fill in the gaps
in the federal law. It is kind of a parachute: on the local level, it can
be wider, and it can also be a gap-filler, in relationship to federal law.
Both the Supreme Court of Kansas and the Supreme Court of Washington have stated that. I think that another problem with the
Pinterv. Dahl approach is that with lawyers and accountants and appraisers and other collateral participants, I think they are culpable
not just when they become over-involved in the wrongdoer's conduct.
I think that's what the Supreme Court had in mind in Pinterv. Dahl.
The one who solicits, the one who makes the call on the client, the
would-be investor, they're over-involved. But in the cases I see, a lot
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of collateral participants are under-involved. That is, like Horatio
Nelson at the Battle of the Nile, they put the "long glass up to their
blind eye": I don't see the wrongdoing.
I was involved in a $25-million apple orchard syndication case, and
the lawyer was approached by the syndicator, as every lawyer who
represents a repeat syndicator has been, and says, "Teach me how to
do this in-house." The lawyer did. He calculated that he would make
mroney on the other business-he did; he billed $350,000 in three
years. He went through some training sessions where he red-lined
their private placement memoranda for them. Then every time the
state securities commission called them on the carpet, the syndicator
would come directly back to the lawyer, and the lawyer would write
the state securities administrator a letter. He'd say this office represents this issuer in this transaction, and the state securities administrator therefore thought the documents were the product of a
reputable law firm, and they would back off. There was a lawyer being under-involved, rather than over-involved. The lawyer said,
"Well, my job is to do what the client requests." My response to that

is that there's a certain minimum engagement. You just don't write
an offering circular, you just don't teach somebody else how to write
an offering circular. The minimum engagement, it seems to me, is to
attempt to get the exemption for the client, which means writing an
offering circular, a due diligence exercise, and other things.
A case of a lawyer being overinvolved is the Norwegian red bull
case. In that case, a promoter would buy bulls for $2200. He would
bring them up to the Northwest, put a million-dollar valuation on
them, and then convey them to a general partnership. The general
partners would take the investment tax credit, and first-year depreciation on a million-dollar valuation. They would receive whopping
tax refunds. They'd keep one third, kick one third back to the promoter, and use one third for buying bull feed. The investors were all
tax rebels. The lawyer, a woman lawyer, very competent, NYU
L.L.M., refused to give an opinion letter on that valuation. But they
went ahead, and when they got in trouble with the Service, she said
"I'll represent you." Well, she was changing from her role as a preventive law lawyer to an advocate. But here comes the fatal mistake:
they had a meeting to organize their defense efforts, and she showed
up in a cowgirl outfit, and one of the expert witnesses, when this
came up in conference, quit at that point. It was a very damning
piece of evidence. It was tried as a state securities action against a
collateral participant, and the jury was not able to differentiate be1267

tween a lawyer's role before the fact, as a preventive law lawyer, and
her role as an advocate cheerleader. Then of course she, by her
cowgirl antic, did it one better-I thought it was a pretty good jokebut she was held liable for $2.2 million. It's on appeal now to the
Washington intermediate appellate court, but she's got a Chapter 11
petition in the trunk of her car, ready to file.
So I have a thick article that you'll be able to read. It is a topic
that I found a book could be written about it. Two books, actually:
you could write a book about tactics and strategy, both on the defense
side and the plaintiff side, and write a book about the substantive law
in the fifty states.
MARK SARGENT

Thanks, Doug. It's really a pleasure to see scholars as accomplished as Doug Branson working on a blue sky topic. I've been laboring in that dusty vineyard by myself for many years, and to see
someone else taking it seriously warms my heart.
I want to talk today about the question of whether limited liability
company interests are securities. This is probably something that
hasn't occurred to anyone here, because there are no limited liability
companies in California yet, although I suspect that there will be
before the end of the year. By the end of this year there will be at
least, I predict, fifteen states with limited liability company statutes,
and probably more within the next two years, unless there is a radical change in policy toward LLCs. I think there are going to be limited liability company statutes everywhere, and I think the standard
form for organization of the small, closely held enterprise is going to
be the limited liability company. That raises, of course, the question
of whether interests in LLCs should be considered securities. Let me
proceed by giving you some background on what limited liability
companies are before I get to the securities question, because that discussion will be incomprehensible unless you've got some sense of
what these are.
The LLC is probably the most interesting form of business organization that has been developed in recent memory. At first glance, it
seems to be just another over-clever tax dodge that will eventually
get squashed by the IRS or Congress, but upon closer inspection, it
actually seems to be worth taking seriously, because it accomplishes
two very fundamental things. First of all, it permits the planner to
choose, quite freely, between entity level taxation and pass-through
taxation, allowing selection of the optimal tax status without sacrifice
of limited liability. By allowing the planner to choose entity taxation,
which is done by forming a corporation, or pass-through taxation, by
forming an LLC without submitting to the substantive limitations
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and intellectual gyrations of qualifying for S-corporation or limited
partnership status, the LLC is really bringing some order to a disordered situation. Secondly, the LLC permits a planner great freedom
to tailor governance and financial arrangements to the owner's needs
(as in a general partnership) while maintaining limited liability (as in
a corporation). This flexibility unleashes ingenuity, allowing the limited liability-seeking owner to escape the straitjacket of the
mandatory provisions of the corporation and limited partnership statutes, and to develop structures more suitable to the reality of life in a
closely held enterprise. I think the LLC statutes may fulfill much of
the promise that was left unfulfilled by the special close corporation
statutes of the 1960s and 1970s.
All of this great promise, however, rests on pretty tenuous foundations. In order for the LLC to be treated as a pass-through entity for
federal tax purposes, it has to be classified as a partnership, and not
as an association taxable as a corporation. Until recently, the IRS'
position with respect to the LLC seemed to be that it should not be
classified as a partnership, because no member of an LLC is liable for
the entity's debts. In 1988, a small crack was opened when the IRS
issued a revenue ruling that recognized a Wyoming LLC as a partnership, and this position was confirmed in a series of private letter rulings between 1990-92 that have consistently classified LLCs as
partnerships. Now, these rulings were highly specific and contingent,
but they have triggered a wave of legislation that led to eight LLC
statutes so far, and will lead to many more within the next eighteen
months. Of course, the significance of all of this will depend on the
IRS maintaining its current position, and upon Congress not deciding
to step in, but if there is no major change at those levels, the LLC is
going to become increasingly important. The other contingent factor,
of course, is that federal tax rates will have to continue to favor passthrough status for small business entity formation.
The LLC raises lots of fascinating questions. It introduces a new
complication into the traditional choice of business form analysis. It
creates interesting planning opportunities, because you can basically
do whatever you want with these entities. There are some very
knotty and arcane tax questions, because everything is balanced on a
razor's edge in order to qualify for partnership status while meeting
your organizational and governance goals. But I don't want to talk
about any of those things other than in passing, because there's also
an important question of whether these interests are going to be
treated as securities. There is no law directly on point. Whether my
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interpretation of this issue is correct will be seen fairly quickly, because the stakes obviously are important. If limited liability interests
are securities, they cannot be offered or sold without registration or
exemption under the federal or state securities laws. If they are securities, their sale also will trigger disclosure obligations and create
the risk of liability under the antifraud provisions of the securities
laws. If they are not securities, business planners will have a field
day. Now they can organize the closely held enterprise as a limited
liability entity, but without having to comply with the securities laws.
The planner can (usually) avoid the securities laws by organizing the
entity as a general partnership, but at the loss of limited liability.
Limited liability can be obtained through incorporation, but subject
to the cost of securities law compliance. The stakes thus really are
very high with respect to this question.
Let me begin my analysis of the definition of the security question
by giving you more detail about what the LLC actually is and what
its advantages might be. Basically, it is a non-corporate business
form in which each of the members has limited liability, and in
which the members can actively participate in management. Those
of you who are familiar with limited partnership law are probably already starting to see a key advantage here with respect to the control
issue. As a non-corporate form of business, the LLC has been
designed to avoid double taxation, and to permit pass-through of income and losses for tax purposes. It also avoids the application of the
mandatory provisions of the corporation statutes that require boards
of directors, officers and the attendant paraphernalia relating to
meetings, voting rights and so on. As a non-corporate entity, the
LLC can also avoid the application of legal capital provisions relating
to par value, stated capital, capital surplus, and all those dreadful antiques. The LLC thus gives an enormous amount of flexibility to the
person who's trying to structure a closely held enterprise. It is very
similar to partnerships in that regard. Unlike general partners, however, the members of the LLC have shareholder-type limited liability, so in essence the LLC is a hybrid: like a general partnership, an
LLC is highly flexible, tailorable, and not taxable at the entity level;
like a corporation, it provides limited liability to its owners. Of
course, there are other partnership/corporation hybrids-that's in essence what the limited partnership is, and that's been around for a
long time-but a great advantage of the LLC over the limited partnership is that its members have no restrictions on the their right to
participate in control. In addition, there's no need for any participant
to have unlimited liability, unlike a general partner in a limited partnership. Of course, the use of corporate general partners can, to
some extent, minimize the impact of the general partner's unlimited
liability, but the LLC is a far simpler and more complete solution.
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Flexibility of the LLC form requires some emphasis. The LLC
statutes contain no rules restricting the issuance of ownership interests, the creation of classes or series of interests, or the allocation of
equity contributions to capital accounts. There are no statutory rules
concerning differential treatment of holders of the same class of interest, as there are under the corporation statutes. This is a handsoff approach, amd it leaves virtually all of the essential elements of
the capital and governance structures to be determined by the parties, with the results reflected in what is usually called an operating
agreement, an instrument roughly analogous to a general partnership
agreement. These statutes also junk the traditional corporation statute hierarchy of shareholders, directors and officers; they thus eliminate all the numerous mandatory distinctions as to who has the
authority to amend the articles or the bylaws, to elect or remove the
managers of the organization, or to authorize distributions of earnings. Whole bodies of corporate law doctrine, such as the rule invalidating board sterilizing agreements, are thus rendered totally
irrelevant. In essence, these statutes allow the owners of the business to use the operating agreement to set up the entity pretty much
as they please, and in a manner far less restrictive than that of the
special close corporation statutes, which have some of the same goals
of LLC statutes but which are far more limiting in their eligibility
criteria and in their use of unanimity requirements.
In short, business planners now have a simple option: they can
have the members manage the entity directly (a "member-managed"
LLC), or they can create a governing group roughly analogous to a
board of directors (a "manager-managed" LLC). This is a distinction
that might be important for securities law purposes, so you might
want to keep that in mind.
The foregoing is not to say that LLCs are entirely informal vehicles. They require a filing in order to be created. Sometimes the
statutes require substantial disclosures with respect to the entity's financing to be included in that filing. Sometimes the statutes limit
the duration of the entity to thirty years. Some statutes have fairly
specific record-keeping requirements. The LLC thus is not as purely
informal as a general partnership can be. There are some
formalities.

The limitations on what can be done with an LLC come from tax
law, not from the statutes themselves or from any desire on the part
of their drafters to impose mandatory rules. There is a complex analysis of the LLC's tax status we don't have time to go through; I'll
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simply mention the three pressure points. If the LLC has centralized
management, there is a greater risk of having an LLC characterized
as an association taxable as a corporation. Therefore, there is an incentive not to have a board of directors-type management, but rather
to have member-managed LLCs. That is one of the factors that will
tend to make LLCs less attractive for public enterprises, although it
is by no means an absolute bar. In addition, to the extent that there
is free transferability of LLC interests, the entity will look more like
a corporation than a partnership from a tax perspective. The safest
course is to require unanimous consent on the part of all members-to
the transfer of interests. Some statutes, however, permit consent to
transfer by a simple majority of the members. That is obviously preferable from a planning standpoint, but it makes the LLC more vulnerable from a tax standpoint. The third problem relates to
continuity of life. This issue is particularly dangerous. The greatest
risk arises when there is a continuity agreement that kicks into play
upon the dissolution of the relation by one of the members and provides for automatic continuation of the business without post-dissolution agreement by the non-dissolving members. It is safer from a tax
standpoint to rely upon post-dissolution consent to continuation, particularly unanimous consent by the remaining members of the LLC.
The net effect of these constrants is to reduce the LLC's usefulness
for public enterprises. A principal effect of the tax law will be to
keep LLCs closely held. That's also significant from a securities
standpoint.
With that background, let me focus on the securities question. The
narrow question, under federal securities law, is whether LLC interests are investment contracts. While LLCs possess certain corporatelike characteristics, they are not corporations. They thus do not issue
stock, which is of course one of the instruments listed in the federal
statutory definitions of security. If they did, the question under Landreth would be whether the stock possessed the common characteristics of stock, and not whether it constituted an investment contract.
Because LLCs do not issue stock or any of the other instruments included on the statutory laundry list, they, like general partnerships
or limited partnerships, must create investment contracts in order to
create securities. That requires us to apply the Howey economic reality test to LLC interests to figure out whether they are investment
contracts. I think it is clear that LLC interests meet most aspects of
the Howey test. LLC members typically invest money in exchange
for their interests. They thus do not create the kinds of uncertainties
associated with more unorthodox forms of investment. They also
usually invest in a common enterprise, in which there is a pooling of
funds between promoters and investors subjected to a common fate.
Investments in LLCs are also likely to meet the more rigorous hori1272
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zontal commonality version of the common enterprise requirement.
Most LLCs are likely to be structured around the joint contributions
of two or more members in a "horizontal" partnership-type relation.
In addition, LLC members are ordinarily going to be expecting profits, and not some unconventional form of benefits. So, those basic elements of the Howey test-investment of money, common enterprise,
expectation of profits-are all likely to be satisfied in most cases.
The real question, of course, is whether LLC members are relying
on the efforts of others, as is required by the final element of the
Howey test. That is, of course, also the central question with respect
to whether analogous forms of enterprise such as general partnerships and limited partnerships are investment contracts. General
partnership interests are virtually presumed not to be securities because general partners retain ultimate control over the enterprise by
means of their statutory authority as general partners. This presumption seems to operate even if the partners, as in a typical large
law firm, have delegated substantial managerial authority, or have
otherwise not -participated in control of the enterprise. The only way
to overcome this presumption is to show that the partners had no
legal or practical ability to exercise their rights of control. That is
the message of Williamson v. Tucker and its progeny.
In contrast, limited partnership interests are presumed to be securities because state limited partnership law theorectically precludes
limited partners from exercising control. Limited partners are thus
presumed to be dependent upon the efforts of others. This presumption is very strong; it seems to operate even under the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, which gives limited partners
substantial rights to participate in control without running the risk of
losing their limited liability. There are only a very few cases that
have held that limited partnership interests are not investment contracts. In those cases there was invariably an extraordinary degree of
limited partner involvement in control, combined with a lack of potential for common trading. Only those unorthodox circumstances
overcame the presumption that limited partners relied on the efforts
of others.
The question is thus where LLCs fall in this polarity between general partnership interests, which are not presumed to be securities,
and limited partnership interests, which are presumed to be securities. I think LLCs are probably least analogous to limited partnerships for purposes of this question. One of the structural advantages
of LLCs over limited partnerships is that LLC members can achieve
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the tax benefits of the entity's pass-through status without risking
their limited liability by participating in control. Thus there is no
state law prohibition or restriction on participation in control of the
LLC. That means that there can be no limited partnership-like presumption that LLC members are dependent on the efforts of others.
Thus we can conclude that the traditional presumption about limited
partnership interests is not applicable to LLC interests.
The analogy is closer to general partnerships. Most LLC statutes
provide that LLCs will be managed by the members unless the articles of organization provide otherwise. There is also substantial incentive for member management, because of the tax risk associated
with delegation of authority to managers. Even if an LLC does have
managers, the LLC members have the authority to elect and remove
the managers. In essence, LLCs and general partnerships both seem
to be entities in which member/partner participation in control
seems to be the essence of the relationship.
As I suggested earlier, the LLC statutes permit considerable leeway in structuring management arrangements. In the real world of
LLCs, there is thus a continuum ranging from almost total deferral
to managers to no deferral to managers and including everything in
between. These variations in the degree of participation in control
should not tip the balance so that limited liability company interests
are treated as securities. I think the same presumption should apply
here that applies in partnership law. Under Williamson v. Tucker, it
is clear that a general partner will not be considered to have
purchased a security unless that partner is so unsophisticated, inexperienced, inexpert, uninformed or dominated by the managers that
he or she is incapable of exercising a partner's authority and is
wholly dependent on the manager. That seems to me to be the
standard.
And I think that this conclusion can be supported by the line of
reasoning in United States Supreme Court cases about the non-securities status of LLC interests such as Marine Bank and Reves, in
which the courts are reluctant to find the presence of a security unless there is a possibility for some sort of "common trading" in that
security. In other words, the Court has begun to define a marketbased element in the definition of security. This definition is still
somewhat incoherent, and the Supreme Court has never really explained what it is trying to do, but I think the clear message in Reves
and Marine Bank is that there is no good reason to apply the federal
securities law to transactions that have been privately negotiated and
involve interests for which there is little if any trading market. I
think that this tendency should reinforce the characterization of LLC
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interests as non-securities, at least so long as the interests are not
marketed publicly.
The response to the argument I am putting forward will probably
be. something like this: Let's assume we've got a manager-managed
LLC with a governing group something like a board of directors, several classes of ownership interests, articles of organization filed in a
state office (i.e., virtual "incorporation"), a high degree of continuity
of life, and only residual authority in the members. That seems to
have something like the "look and feel" of a close corporation: it
walks like a corporation, talks like a corporation, squawks like a corporation. The only thing that seems to be missing from this picture
is stock. The argument thus could be made that such LLC interests
are closely analogous to stock in a close corporation, and hence
should be treated as securities, since stock in a close corporation is
universally regarded as a security. I think this is dead wrong, and I
think that it is an argument that proceeds on the basis of an erroneous assumption. Stock in a close corporation is a security, technically, because stock is listed as a security within the statutory
definition of security. The fact that it is listed as a security, however,
does not mean that it makes sense from a policy perspective to treat
that form of ownership interest in a closely held enterprise as a security subject to the coverage of the securities laws.
This issue was at stake in the sale of business cases. Since the
Supreme Court resolved that dispute in the Landreth decision, however, it has become clear that stock will be treated as a security (at
least stock bearing the common characteristics of a security) largely
because it would be a tremendous waste of time to try to figure out
on a case-by-case basis whether stock is a security. That kind of caseby-case determination would be too upsetting to commonsensical expectations that this very familiar form of instrument will always be
treated as a security, and it would probably inject just too much uncertainty into routine transactions. Those are very powerful considerations. But only such powerful considerations should be permitted
to overcome what should be the basic presumption, i.e., that interests
in closely held enterprises-whatever their form of organizationshould not be treated as securities. Sales of these interests in private,
informal and negotiated transactions, regardless of whether the parties are called partners, shareholders; or members, take place outside
of the context of public securities markets, and thus should be governed by the common law of fraud, fiduciary duty and contract. We
thus should not assume that LLC interests should be considered se1275

curities because they are analogous to stock in a close corporation.
We should recognize instead that the status of close corporation stock
as a security should be regarded as an unfortunate exception, a historical anomaly that can be justified, if it all, only by profound considerations of convenience and historical expectations. We should not
make the same exceptions with respect to LLC interest, with respect
to which there is no historical baggage (and no inconvenient statutory language). The analogy of LLC interests to corporate stock thus
should not enhance the risk of securitization of LLC interests, but
should rather call into question the theoretical underpinnings of the
traditional assumption that stock in a close corporation is a security.
In any event, I could go on and on with this, but I'm taking entirely
too much time, so I'll stop there. I should add that there is a nasty
little wrinkle in states like California: the risk capital test for the
definition of security. It's possible that there might be somewhat
greater exposure under that test. To the extent that the risk capital
analysis, however, requires a showing of some dependence on the efforts of others, the same analysis that applied under Howey should
apply, and should cut against the finding that an interest in an LLC
is a security. There is, however, a tendency in risk capital jurisdictions to read the definition of security more broadly, particularly
when a transaction involves the initial capitalization of an enterprise,
and when there is no guarantee or collateralization intended to mitigate the risk that the purchaser might incur. So, arguably, you may
have some greater exposure under a California risk capital analysis,
but whether you should or not is another story. Thank you.
JANET KERR

The purpose of this presentation is to provide a summary of the
Reves case and then review some of the more important cases which
have been decided following Reves. Additionally, I will talk about
the problems which have arisen in applying Reves.
In Reves, the Supreme Court determined when notes are securities.
Prior to Reves, there were conflicting approaches used in the circuits
to determine this issue. Even though notes are specifically mentioned as being securities in Section 2(1) of the 1933 Act (although
certain short-term notes are exempted for registration purposes) as
well as in Section 3(a)(10) in the 1934 Act, (i.e., those notes which
have a maturity of more than nine months), many circuits and lower
courts ignored this express statutory language and determined that
notes were not securities in all situations. The courts felt that unlike
stock, notes may be a part of many different types of transactions,
not all of which may be covered by the securities law. Many courts
preferred to look at the economic reality of the underlying transac1276
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tion to which the note was attached to determine if the note was in
fact a security. In doing so, four different types of tests or approaches resulted. Some circuits applied the Howey investment contract test to notes while others applied a commercial/investment
dichotomy test. Still other circuits applied a risk capital test and finally the Second Circuit applied the family resemblance test. All of
these tests essentially ask the same question-that is, what is the economic reality of the underlying transaction that the note represents
(i.e., is it a consumer/commercial loan transaction or, on the other
hand, is it an investment)? If it is the former, then it is probably not
a security.
The Court in Reves resolved what the test should be for notes but
before the four-factor test was discussed by the Court in Reves, the
Court accepted the Second Circuit's interpretation of the statutory
definition of a security to include notes as a security. Therefore,
Reves affirmed that notes carry the presumption of being securities.
Secondly, the Court provided defendants two possible ways to rebut
that presumption. One way was for defendants to state that their
transaction was one of the specifically mentioned transactions on the
family resemblance list. In that case, the note representing the transaction was not a security. The second avenue of rebuttal was if the
defendants did not find their transaction on the list, they could argue
using the four-factor test that it should be on the list and, therefore,
found not to be a security.
Now I will discuss the four-factor test. The first factor in the Reves
case is the motivation of the buyer and seller. The Reves case said
that if the motivation of the buyer and the seller are primarily investment oriented, then it's going to be a security. But if not, the motivation will be representative of a loan transaction such as a
consumer loan transaction, or a commercial lending transaction,
where a security would not be found. The Court said that if the
seller's purpose is to "finance substantial investments" or "to raise
money for the general use of a business enterprise," then it's probably going to be found to be a security. If the buyer's intent is an expectation of profit, i.e., an investment, then this motivation is more
indicative of a security.
The second factor of the Reves test determines whether the note
was given pursuant to a plan of distribution in which there was a secondary kind of trading intent or what the Court called "common
trading for speculation." The Court did not define what "plan of distribution" meant, but it probably excludes transactions that are nego1277

tiated one-on-one. If there is a widespread plan of distribution, then
it is more apt to be a security.
The third factor in the Reves case tries to ascertain what the reasonable expectations of the investing public are, i.e., what does the
public think this note/transaction represents? Would the public
think it is an investment or, on the other hand, a commercial lending
kind of situation, such as a consumer loan situation?
The last factor of Reves determines whether there are risk-reducing factors present in the transaction at hand. The Court felt that if
risk-reducing factors were present, then it was less likely to be a security. The Court didn't really define what those factors would be,
but the Court did mention these factors could be regulatory in nature
and even perhaps non-regulatory in certain situations.
Some issues were not resolved in the Reves case and have caused
problems. In Reves, the fact situation involved demand notes. The
Court did not determine whether demand notes would be considered
to be notes that were nine months or less in maturity and therefore
fall within the exemption language of the Exchange Act. Secondly,
the issue was raised but not resolved as to whether all notes nine
months or less should be automatically exempted under the Exchange Act. It was posited that perhaps only high-quality commercial paper with such a maturity should be exempted. If this is true
and all short-term notes are not exempted, then should those notes
that are not exempted carry the presumption they are securities as
do other notes that are not short-term?
Besides these areas that are unaddressed, I want to discuss some
common problems that have arisen from cases decided since Reves.
Since Reves there have been some circuit court cases, as well as
some lower court decisions. One common problem seen in all of
these cases is a lack of uniformity in application of the Reves fourfactor test. The Court in Reves did not state that all four factors
must be applied. As as result, some of the cases since Reves have
used only two or three factors. The Supreme Court, in failing to
make clear if all four factors should be used, has left open another
problem: if not all four factors are used, which one or ones should be
used? A collateral question is, what weight do we give to the various
factors? Are they the same or different?
Another problem in the post-Reves cases involves confusion over
some of the terms used in the Reves factors. One area of confusion
involves the second factor. Distribution and trading involve concepts
that appear to be used by the Court to mean the same thing but in
reality are two different concepts. Some of the courts in the postReves cases have felt that one must actually have a secondary trading
market in order to have a security. Other courts have said that even
1278
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if you have just a few investors, and the notes are given to those investors, then you have a plan of distribution.
Another post-Reves problem involves the fourth factor and the definition of risk-reducing factors. Some courts have defined this to
mean the presence of another federal regulatory system. Other
courts conclude that if a common law cause of action exists, this is
enough. Finally, other courts posit that if collateral for the note is
given, this may be enough of a risk-reducing factor.
As mentioned before, another problem area is how to handle shortterm notes. I already stated the issues that are unresolved pertaining
to this area and, sure enough, they have arisen in the post-Reves
cases. For short-term notes, at least under the 1934 Act, are all notes
that are nine months or less automatically exempted?
Moving away from short-term note issues are other problems relating once again to the factors in Reves. Another problem arises from
the third factor of the Reves test involving the reasonable expectations of the public. What does that mean? As you know, if one took
a poll of the investing public, one would find a diverse group. One
would find the general, non-sophisticated public, as well as the sophisticated public, i.e., the institutional investors. Also, there are investors in between. The Reves case doesn't define who the investing
public is. That is problematic, especially if there is an esoteric transaction that is represented by a note. In this situation, nine times out
of ten, the expectation of the general investing public is that they've
never heard of it.
Still another problem area relates to the first factor of Reves and
that is, what happens if there are different buyer and seller motivations? If the buyer has one motivation and the seller has another,
then which motivation is determinative? As the test stands, it is easy
to get around this factor by the defendant taking the opposite side
from the plaintiff. So if you have differing motivations, how is this
treated? Is the motivation of the buyer perhaps more important than
the seller's? This issue is not addressed in Reves.
The final problem involves the Reves presumption. The Court in
Reves presumed that notes for the most part are securities. Since
Reves, there are some cases that just dive right into the four-factor
test without applying the presumption. This ignores the express statutory language in Section 2(1) of the Act and Section 3(a)(10) of the
Exchange Act.
At this time I'd like to mention some significant cases since Reves.
Unfortunately, I cannot mention them all. One is Banco Espafiol de
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Credito v. Security Paciefc National Bank in the Second Circuit,
Southern District of New York, in 1991. In that case, the plaintiffs
purchased participations in short-term bank loans, i.e., loan participations. The question was, is this a security? The court said that even
though the underlying loans were not securities, perhaps the loan
participations themselves would be. The Court then applied Reves.
Three things are very important in this case and perhaps give some
guidelines for future application of the Reves test. First of all, this
case does open up the possibility that a participation in a non-security
may ultimately be a security. That is, that even though a mortgage
note is not a security, if there were a mortgage pool, or a loan pool
situation where there was a secondary market, then there may be a
security.
Another significant issue raised in the case is how to define the investing public. Even though the court didn't attempt to define this, it
did acknowledge that there may be a problem if the investing public
has differing perceptions. In that particular case, the solicitation was
made to sophisticated investors. The court said that if the investing
public was the general public, there was no perception since they had
no knowledge of the program's existence.
The final significant matter in this case was that the court felt that
since bank loans are regulated by the Office of the Comptroller, this
is a risk-reducing factor.
The second case is also in the Second Circuit, the Southern District
of New York case of National Bank of Yugoslavia v. Drexel Burnham Lambert. The question was whether time deposits are securities. The court applied the four-factor Reves test. Drexel argued that
in this situation, time deposits were analogous to something that was
already on the family resemblance list. The court disagreed and applied the four-factor test and found that there was a security. I will
discuss the more significant parts of this case. First, the court raised
the issue of differing buyer and seller motivations. Drexel took the
position that this was not an investment situation but a loan situation. The plaintiff of course stated the opposite. The problem with
differing motivations was not resolved but this case brings up the issue that Reves provides no guidance as to what to do when this happens. Secondly, the court said that the fact that there was no
widespread plan of distribution was not a fatal factor in not finding a
security. This seems to diminish the importance of this factor.
Thirdly, in addressing the risk-reducing factor part of the Reves test,
the court stated that the short maturity of the notes was not necessarily a risk-reducing factor. In regard to this factor, Drexel argued
that since common law as well as applicable bankruptcy laws existed,
satisfactory risk-reducing factors were present. The court said that
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since both of these laws existed before the securities laws came into
existence, they should not be considered risk-reducing factors. Finally, as far as the short-term note issue, the court said that the 1934
Act only exempts short-term notes that are considered to be commercial paper.
IIn the Fifth Circuit, in Reader v. Palmer,in a lower
court decision
in Louisiana, the question was whether postdated checks were securities. In this case, a travel agency issued postdated checks for travel
junkets. The court did not find the checks were securities. The court
found no need to examine the third prong of the Reves case since the
public could not have had any expectations about something it never
saw. This was an unusual definition of public expectations, indicating
that somehow the public had to be polled or had to have at least seen
the transaction to satisfy this factor.
The Sixth Circuit, in Mercer v. Jaffe, Snider,Raitt and Heuer,
P.C.,
a lower court Michigan case, addressed the question of whether notes
secured by home mortgages are securities. The court recognized that
the notes in this type of transaction were on the family resemblance
list and, therefore, not a security; however, it stated that since these
notes were sold in a secondary market, this changed the nature of the
transaction. Reves was therefore applied. When applying the fourth
factor, the court stated that a risk-reducing factor could be adequate
collateralization.
In the Ninth Circuit, there are two cases. The first case is not as
important as the second. The first case is First Citizens FederalSavings & Loan Assoc. v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co. The question was
whether a loan participation agreement, represented by a note, was a
security. The court ruled it was not. It stated merely that this type
of transaction was already on the family resemblance list of non-securities, therefore, applying Reves was unnecessary. The second
Ninth Circuit case, SEC v. R.G. Reynolds Enterprises,was decided in
December 199:1. In this case, a defendant had what is called a managed account. The defendant would get people to lend him money,
stating he would invest it for them. Notes represented these loans.
Unfortunately, the defendant invested this money in his fianc&e, in
buying cars for himself, etc. As one can imagine, the investors were
irate when they found out about these "investments." They argued
the notes were securities. The court applied the Reves four factors.
First, the court said that the motivation of buyer and seller in this
case was definitely investment-oriented. In fact, the notes, as well as
the entire transaction, were marketed as an "investment." The sec1281

ond factor, the plan of distribution, involved a wide distribution, not a
one-on-one situation. Numerous people held the notes. The third
factor, the expectations of the investing public, was met since the
transaction was sold on television as an "investment." Finally, regarding the fourth factor, the court merely said, in just one passing
sentence, there was no risk-reducing factor. One thing is particularly
important about the case, and that is the court felt that notes nine
months or less, for the purposes of the 1934 Act, should be exempted
only if they are commercial paper. Additionally, they added that
notes that did not fall into that category of commercial paper should
carry the presumption that they are securities even if they are nine
months or less in maturity. The Ninth Circuit attempted to resolve
this issue, which was left open in Reves.
Despite some instruction from cases following Reves, several issues
still need explanation or further resolution. First, the motivation of
buyers and sellers is a factor that is too easy to get around. The defendant simply takes the opposite side from the plaintiff and the defendant then wins out on this factor because no instruction exists to
guide the courts in this situation. I think what is more important is
the motivation of the buyer in most instances. Secondly, with regard
to the plan of distribution factor, even though one-on-one transactions will not satisfy that factor, one-on-one transactions which
evolve into a secondary market should become a security. The actual
underlying instrument is not itself a security but if one has a loan
which thereafter becomes a part of a mortgage pool, then certainly,
secondary trading should make it a security. As I mentioned, some
cases agreed with this; one did not. This should be resolved. Maybe
this is what the Court in Reves was trying to say when they used secondary market language. Thirdly, risk-reducing factors can be many;
however, I think only those that address the particular wrong should
be considered. For example, if one is going to point to a relevant federal regulatory system as being a risk-reducing factor in a certain
case, then it should be a law or system which addresses that type of
wrong in that particular case. It should not be something that just
addresses wrongs in a general or peripheral way. Additionally, common law causes of action should not be risk-reducing factors. Many
times these causes of action are fraught with defenses that should not
be available in securities cases. Finally, I do think that short-term
notes (i.e., ones which are not exempted) should be considered to be
risk-reducing factors.

1282

